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[This article examines the capacity of parents of children (whether dis-
abled or not) born as a result of medical negligence to sue for the costs 
associated with the birth and raising of the children (‘wrongful birth’), as 
well as the capacity of disabled children who owe their existence to medi-
cal negligence to sue for the costs associated with the disability (‘wrong-
ful life’).  Many legal systems have allowed the first type of claim, but very 
few have allowed the second type.  The author argues that allowing both 
types of claim is consistent with ordinary principles of tort law, and that 
there are no policy reasons that override this conclusion.  Consequently, a 
range of damages ought to be available in relation to both types of claim.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In July 2003, the High Court of Australia held by a 4:3 majority that where an 
unplanned child is born through medical negligence, the parents may sue the 
negligent doctor to recover the costs of raising the child to maturity.1  Acting 
Prime Minister of Australia John Anderson denounced the decision as “repug-
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1
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003).  
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nant”, claiming it “devalue[d]…life” and treated “vulnerable children” as “mere 
commodities”.2 
In April 2004, the NSW Court of Appeal held by a 2:1 majority that where a 
disabled child owes his or her existence to an act of medical negligence, the 
child cannot sue the negligent doctor to recover the costs associated with the 
disability.3  An appeal to the High Court has been foreshadowed.4 
These cases involve the ‘birth torts’: wrongful birth and wrongful life respec-
tively.  The subject of this paper is whether Australian courts, based on estab-
lished principles of tort law, should award damages for these torts.  Three issues 
arise for each tort.  First, what are the options for recovery of damages?  In other 
words, what heads of damages (if any) might be held to be recoverable for 
wrongful birth or wrongful life?  Second, what heads of damages (if any) would 
be recoverable under ‘normal’ tort principles—that is, principles not invoking 
broad considerations of public policy?  Third, are there persuasive policy 
grounds for choosing an option other than that reached through normal princi-
ples? 
Part II discusses wrongful birth.  It will be argued that ‘pregnancy costs’ and 
‘upbringing costs’ (in the sense to be defined) are recoverable on normal princi-
ples, and that the policy arguments for other options are unpersuasive.  Part III 
discusses wrongful life.  It will be argued that damages for pain, suffering and 
‘disability costs’ are recoverable on normal principles, and that the policy argu-
ments for other options are, again, weak.  Damages for the birth torts should thus 
be awarded. 
II WRONGFUL BIRTH 
A Definitions and Approaches 
1 Wrongful birth defined 
Wrongful birth occurs where an act of medical negligence causes the birth of 
an unplanned child.  The child may be ‘healthy’ (non-disabled) or disabled.  
The negligence may involve a doctor’s failure to:5 
                                                           
2
  John Anderson, Cattanach Decision: Statement by the Acting Prime Minister (Press Release, 17 July 
2003), <http://www.ministers.dotars.gov.au/ja/releases/2003/july/a80_2003.htm> (last visited Mar. 8, 
2005). 
3
  Harriton v. Stephens; Waller v. James; Waller v. Hoolahan, (2004) NSWCA 93 (NSW Court of 
Appeal, 2004) (Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA; Mason P dissenting). 
4
  M Pelly, Sydney Morning Herald, Tougher Limits on Suing Doctors, 30 April 2004, <http:// 
www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/29/1083224520781.html > (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). 
5
  Laura Hoyano, Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception, 65 MODERN L.REV. 883, 886 n. 26 
(2002); see also: JOHN SEYMOUR, CHILDBIRTH AND THE LAW  ch 5 (2000). 
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(a) warn of the risk that a competently performed sterilisation may natu-
rally reverse or otherwise fail; so that the plaintiffs, unaware of that 
risk, cease using contraception; 
(b) diagnose or advise of pregnancy, where diagnosis or advice would                                                           
have   led to lawful6 termination; 
(c) diagnose a condition in either the parents or the foetus that will cause 
the child to be disabled, where diagnosis would have led to effective 
contraception or lawful termination; 
(d) take reasonable care in performing an attempted sterilisation or abor-
tion; or 
(e) take reasonable care in giving advice on, or supplying, contraceptives. 
Each of (a)-(e) creates a risk that an unplanned pregnancy will occur or continue.  
If the risk eventuates, and the pregnancy is carried to term—because pregnancy 
was discovered too late to terminate safely or legally, or because the plaintiffs 
feel morally or emotionally unable to terminate—then wrongful birth has oc-
curred. 
In a wrongful birth action, the parent or parents sue the doctor in negligence in 
respect of the damage resulting from the pregnancy and birth.  The damage may 
include: 
(i) pregnancy costs: the pain, suffering and economic loss associated 
with pregnancy, including labour pains, medical bills, maternity 
clothes, loss of income during pregnancy, and (less commonly) 
the cost of moving or extending the house in anticipation of ac-
commodating an extra member; and 
(ii) upbringing costs: the costs of raising the child from birth to matur-
ity or independence, including amounts spent on food, clothes, 
education, presents and entertainment; plus loss of income through 
looking after the child, and (if this occurs after birth) the cost of 
moving or extending house to accommodate an extra member.7 
                                                           
6
 See: Medical Practitioners Act, 1930, ss55A-55E (ACT) ; Crimes Act, 1900, ss82-84 (NSW) ; Criminal 
Code Act, 1983, ss172-174 (NT); Criminal Code Act, 1899, ss224-226 (Qld); Criminal Law Consolida-
tion Act, 1935, ss81-82A (SA); Criminal Code Act, 1924, ss134-135 (Tas) ; Crimes Act, 1958, ss65-66 
(Vic); Health Act, 1911, s334 (WA).  See also: R v. Wald, (1971) 3 DCR (NSW 25 (District Court of 
NSW, 1971); R v. Davidson (1969) VR 667 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 1969); CES v. Superclinics 
(Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47 (NSW Supreme Court,, 1995) .  If the termination would not 
have been lawful, the defendant may rely on the defence of illegality; see Superclinics. 
7
  In addition to pregnancy and upbringing costs, the father can apparently recover for ‘loss of consor-
tium’; see Cattanach v. Melchior [2003] 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, [14]-[15] (High Court of 
Australia, 2003) .  This is an award of damages ‘for all practical, domestic disadvantages suffered by a 
husband in consequence of the impair[ment, during or after pregnancy, of the] health or bodily condition 
of his wife’:; see Toohey v. Hollier [1955] 92 CLR 618 (High Court of Australia, 1955). The viability of 
claims for loss of consortium was not on appeal in Cattanach, but Gleeson CJ appeared doubtful, noting 
‘such claims are now anomalous, and bear a proprietorial character inconsistent with current ideas as to 
the relationship between husband and wife’:  
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The terms ‘wrongful birth’, ‘wrongful pregnancy’ and ‘wrongful conception’ 
have been variously defined, sometimes interchangeably.8  Here, only ‘wrongful 
birth’ is used, and has the meaning given above.  Strictly, what is ‘wrongful’ is 
the negligence, not the birth;9 but the label is a convenient shorthand. 
2 Options for recovery of damages 
The reasonable options for recovery of damages are generally considered to be:10 
(1) full recovery without set-off: upbringing and pregnancy costs can 
be awarded whether the child is healthy or disabled; and damages 
are not reduced for any emotional benefits the child will bring to 
the parents (but may perhaps be reduced for any financial benefits 
the child will bring, such as statutory welfare benefits). 
(2) full recovery with set-off: as for full recovery, but damages are re-
duced (offset) for any emotional benefits the child will bring. 
(3) pregnancy and extra disability costs only: pregnancy costs can be 
awarded; upbringing costs can be awarded, but only where either 
the child, or perhaps a parent, is disabled, and limited to the extra 
costs attributable to the disability (‘extra’ compared to the cost for 
a non-disabled person). 
(4) pregnancy costs only: pregnancy costs can be awarded; upbringing 
costs cannot be awarded, even if the child is disabled. 
(5) no recovery: neither pregnancy nor upbringing costs can be 
awarded. 
3 Existing authorities: UK, US and Canada 
In the UK, the first reported wrongful birth case allowed recovery of pregnancy 
costs.11  Lower courts initially disallowed recovery of upbringing costs for 
policy reasons,12 but later allowed recovery with no offset for healthy,13 dis-
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  See: Cattanach v. Melchior ([2003)] 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, [285] (Callinan J)High Court of 
Australia, 2003) ; McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961 (House of Lords, 1999); 
[2000] 2 AC 59, 76G (Court of Appeal, England, 2000)(Lord Steyn), 91G-92A (Lord Hope), 99B-C 
(Lord Clyde); Kealey v. Berezowski ([1996)] 136 DLR (4th) 708 (Ontario Court, General Division), 
723f-724d (Lax J); L Hoyano, Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception, 65 MODERN L. REV. 883-
906, 884 (2002); A Maclean, ‘McFarlane v Tayside Health Board: A Wrongful Conception in the House 
of Lords?’ Web Journal of Current Legal Issues [2000] 3 Web JCLI [s 1]  
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue3/maclean3.html>.(last visited 8 March 2005). 
9
  Cattanach v. Melchior [2003] 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, (High Court of Australia, 2003) [57], 
[68] (McHugh and Gummow JJ), [193] (Hayne J); SEYMOUR, supra note 5, at 75. 
10
  Cattanach v. Melchior [2003] 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, (High Court of Australia, 2003) [138] 
(Kirby J); see also Melchior v. Cattanach [2001] QCA 246, (Queensland Court of Appeal,2001) [151] 
(Thomas JA). 
11
  Scuriaga v. Powell [1979] 123 SJ 406 (QBD). 
12
  Udale v. Bloomsbury Health Authority [1983] All ER 522 (House of Lords, 1983); [1983] 1 WLR 
1098 (QBD). 
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abled,14 and temporarily disabled15 children—extending even to the costs of 
private education16 and upbringing past age 18.17  In McFarlane, the House of 
Lords cast aside this lower-court authority and held—largely through unsup-
ported intuitions on what is ‘fair, just and reasonable’18—that upbringing costs 
for a healthy child are not recoverable.  Lower courts have since confined 
McFarlane to allow the extra upbringing costs attributable to a child’s19 or 
mother’s20 disability.  However, in Rees—another morass of unsupported intui-
tions—the House of Lords held by majority that the mother’s extra disability 
costs are not recoverable21 (though a different majority held, obiter, that extra 
costs attributable to the child’s disability are recoverable22).  In an admitted 
‘gloss’23—an arbitrary and unprincipled exception to the policy in 
McFarlane24—Rees also held that wrongful birth parents may recover a nominal 
sum of £15,000 for violation of their autonomy.25  The UK thus allows recovery 
of pregnancy costs and the extra costs attributable to the child’s disability. 
US decisions are numerous and divergent because the birth torts are a state rather 
than federal matter.  Some states permit full recovery with26 or without27 offset.  
                                                                                                                                         
13
  Thake v. Maurice [1986] 1 QB 644; [1986] 1 All ER 497 (CA) (Court of Appeal, 1986); Allen v. 
Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 1 All ER 651 (House of Lords, 1993); (1992) 13 BMLR 47 
(Queens Bench Division); Fish v. Wilcox [1994] 5 Med LR 230 (CA). 
14
  Emeh v. Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] 1 QB 1012; [1984] 
3 All ER 1044 (CA). 
15
  Robinson v. Salford Health Authority [1992] 3 Med LR 270 (QBD). 
16
  Benarr v. Kettering Health Authority [1988] 138 NLJ 179 (QBD). 
17
  Nunnerley v. Warrington Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 170 (QBD); Taylor v. Shropshire 
Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 96 (QBD).  But see also claims denied for causation reasons: 
Salih v. Enfield Health Authority [1991] 3 All ER 400 (CA); R v. Croydon Health Authority [1998] 
Lloyd’s Rep Med 44 (CA). 
18
  McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961; [2000] 2 AC 59 (UK House of Lords, 
2000), 76C (Lord Slynn), 83D-E (Lord Steyn), 97C (Lord Hope).  Applied in Greenfield v Irwin [2001] 
1 WLR 1279 (CA). 
19
  Rand v. East Dorset Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 181 (QBD); Hardman v Amin [2000] 
Lloyd’s Rep Med 498 (QBD); Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] 
EWCA Civ 530; [2001] 3 All ER 97; Groom v Selby [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 39 (QBD). 
20
  Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 88; [2002] All ER 177 (House 
of Lords, 2002)). 
21
  Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [9] (House Of Lords, 2003) 
(Lord Bingham), [18] (Lord Nicholls), [114] (Lord Millett), [143] (Lord Scott); [39] (Lord Steyn), [68] 
(Lord Hope), [96]-[98] (Lord Hutton), dissenting. 
22
  Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, (House of Lords, 2003) [35]  
(Lord Steyn), [57] (Lord Hope), [91] (Lord Hutton), [112] (Lord Millett); [9] (Lord Bingham), [18] 
(Lord Nicholls), [145] (Lord Scott), dissenting. 
23
  Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, (House of Lords, 2003) [7] (Lord 
Bingham), [17] (Lord Nicholls). 
24
  See: Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, (House of Lords, 2003) 
[40]-[47] (Lord Steyn), [70]-[77] (Lord Hope); Cattanach v. Melchior [2003] 199 ALR 131; [2003] 
HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [91] (McHugh and Gummow JJ), [165] (Kirby J). 
25
  Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, (House of Lords, 2003) [8] (Lord 
Bingham), [17] & [19] (Lord Nicholls), [123]-[125] (Lord Millett), [148] (Lord Scott). 
26
  Arizona (University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court 667 P2d 1294, 1299 
[1983]); Connecticut (Ochs v. Borelli 445 A 2d 883, 886 [1982]); Minnesota (Sherlock v. Stillwater 
Clinic 260 NW 2d 169, 175-76 [1977]). 
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A majority disallow recovery of upbringing costs where the child is healthy,28 
but some allow recovery of extra disability costs.29 
Canadian courts have largely mirrored the UK, but with some variation among 
jurisdictions.  Lower courts initially disallowed recovery of upbringing costs for 
policy reasons,30 but subsequent cases awarded pregnancy and upbringing costs 
for healthy children (with an offset for emotional benefits31) and for disabled 
children32 (though in some cases this was limited to the extra costs attributable to 
the child’s disability33).  More recently, however, lower courts have held that 
upbringing costs for a healthy child can only be awarded where the parents had 
decided for financial reasons to have no further children;34 or have held that such 
costs should not be awarded at all.35  The law regarding healthy children is thus 
uncertain.  For disabled children, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted (obiter, 
                                                                                                                                         
27
  California [Custodio v. Bauer 251 Cal.App 2d 303, 59 Cal.Rptr 463 [1967]); New Mexico (Lovelace 
Medical Center v. Mendez 805 P 2d 603 [1991]); Oregon (Zehr v. Haugen 871 P 2d 1006 [1994]); 
Wisconsin (Marciniak v. Lundborg 450 N.W.2d 243 [1990]). 
28
  Including: Alabama (Boone v. Mullendore 416 So 2d 718 [1982]); Alaska (M.A. v. United States 951 
P 2d 851 [1998]); Arkansas (Wilbur v. Kerr 628 SW 2d 568 [1982]); District of Columbia (Flowers v. 
District of Columbia 478 A 2d 1073 [1984]); Florida (Fassoulas v. Ramey 450 So 2d 822 [1984]); 
Georgia (Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson 398 SE 2d 557 [1990]); Illinois (Cockrum 
v. Baumgartner 447 NE 2d 385 [1983], cert denied, 464 U.S. 846, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed 2d 139 
(1983)); Iowa (Nanke v. Napier 346 NW 2d 520 [1984]); Kansas (Johnston v. Elkins 736 P 2d 935 
[1987]); Kentucky (Schork v. Huber 648 SW 2d 861 [1983]); Louisiana (Pitre v. Opelousas General 
Hospital 530 So 2d 1151 [1988]); Maine (Macomber v. Dillman 505 A 2d 810 [1986]); Michigan (Rouse 
v. Wesley 494 NW 2d 7 [1992]); Missouri (Girdley v. Coats 825 S.W 2d 295 [1992]); Nebraska (Hitze-
mann v. Adam 518 NW 2d 102 [1994]); Nevada (Szekeres v. Robinson 715 P 2d 1076 [1986]); New 
Hampshire (Kingsbury v. Smith 442 A 2d 1003 [1982]); New Jersey (Gracia v. Meiselman 531 A 2d 
1373 [1987] (obiter)); New York (O’Toole v. Greenberg 477 NE 2d 445 [1985]); North Carolina 
(Jackson v. Bumgardner 347 SE 2d 743 [1986]); Ohio (Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland 
540 NE 2d 1370 [1989]); Oklahoma (Wofford v. Davis 764 P 2d 161 [1988]); Pennsylvania (Butler v. 
Rolling Hill Hospital 582 A 2d 1384 [1990]); Rhode Island (Emerson v. Magendantz 689 A 2d 409 
[1997]); Tennessee (Smith v. Gore 728 SW 2d 738 [1987]); Texas (Terrell v. Garcia 496 SW 2d 124 
[1973]); Utah (C.S. v. Nielson 767 P 2d 504 (\[1988]); Virginia (Miller v. Johnson 343 SE 2d 301 
[1986]); Washington (McKernan v. Aasheim 687 P 2d 850 [1984)]; West Virginia (James G. v. Caserta 
332 SE 2d 872 [1985]); Wyoming (Beardsley v. Wierdsma 650 P 2d 288 [1982]).  Authorities collected 
in: Chaffee v Seslar (Unreported, Indiana Supreme Court, 15 April 2003),  
<http://www.marciaoddi.com/cgi-local/blogdocs/Chaffee.pdf> (last visited 8 March 2005). 
29
  See: Bader v. Johnson 675 NE 2d 1119 (Indiana Court of Appeal, 1997). 
30
  Colp v. Ringrose ([1976)] 3 L Med Q 72 (Aberta SCTD) (obiter); Doiron v. Orr ([1978)] 86 DLR (3d) 
719 (Ontario HC); Cataford v. Moreau ([1978)] 114 DLR (3d) 585 (Québec SC) (obiter).  See also: 
Keats v. Pearce ([1984)] 48 Nfld & PEIR 102 (Newfoundland SCTD) (upbringing costs disallowed 
because plaintiff could have mitigated losses through abortion); Fredette v. Wiebe ([1986)] 29 DLR (4th) 
534, 4 BCLR (2d) 184 (SC) (upbringing costs disallowed because plaintiff would have had children and 
incurred those costs anyway). 
31
  Suite v. Cooke [1993] RJQ 514, 15 CCLT (2d) 15 (SC), affirmed [1995] RJQ 2765 (CA). 
32
  Joshi v Wooley [1995] 4 BCLR (3d) 208 (SC). 
33
  Cherry v. Borsman ([1990)] 75 DLR (4th) 668 (SC), varied (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 487 (CA). 
34
  Kealey v Berezowski [1996] 136 DLR (4th) 708 (Ontario Court, General Division); MS v. Baker 
[2001] ABQB 1032, [2002] 4 WWR 487 (obiter). 
35
  Mummery v. Olsson [2001] OJ No 226 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice); MY v Boutros [2002] 
ABQB 362, 11 CCLT (3d) 271; Bevilacqua v. Altenkirk [2004] BCSC 945 (awarded damages for pain, 
suffering and inconvenience, but no pecuniary damages); Roe v. Dabbs [2004] BCSC 957 (awarded 
damages for pain, suffering, inconvenience, and loss of income during pregnancy, but no other pecuniary 
damages). 
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since the point was not on appeal) that plaintiffs can recover pregnancy costs and 
the extra upbringing costs attributable to the child’s disability—though the latter 
are discounted according to the probability of those costs being borne by the 
state.36 
4  Existing authorities: Australia 
Before Cattanach,37 wrongful birth was considered in NSW and Queensland.  In 
NSW, damages were awarded for pregnancy costs but not upbringing costs, 
since the plaintiff’s choice to keep the child rather than adopt it out allegedly 
severed causation between the negligence and upbringing costs.38  In Queen-
sland, full recovery was permitted through an application of normal principles 
and rejection of opposing policy arguments.39 
In Cattanach, a sterilisation was performed on only one fallopian tube, since the 
mother falsely believed her other tube had been removed as a child.  The sterilis-
ing doctor negligently failed to warn that the mother should have this belief 
checked (if it were false, she could still conceive).40  As a result the plaintiffs 
ceased using contraception, thinking they could not conceive, and—because the 
second tube was in fact present—a healthy son was later conceived and born.  
The parents sued the sterilising doctor and the State of Queensland (the latter as 
responsible for the hospital where the sterilisation occurred).  Pregnancy and 
upbringing costs were awarded at first instance41 and upheld on appeal.42  On 
further appeal, the High Court confirmed that upbringing costs are recoverable.43  
Pregnancy costs were not on appeal, but the absurdity of allowing upbringing 
costs without pregnancy costs makes full recovery the de facto position. 
                                                           
36
  Krangle v. Brisco [2002] 1 SCR 205 (Supreme Court of Canada).  The Court disallowed upbringing 
costs past the age of majority (19), since those costs (given the facts and British Columbia legislation) 
would be borne by the state, not the parents.  Krangle was followed in: Zhang v. Kan [2003] BCJ No 
164; [2003] BCSC 5 (extra disability costs awarded to age 45 but discounted by 70% because the state 
would likely bear those costs); and Jones v. Rostvig [2003] BCJ No 1840; [2003] BCSC 1222 (extra 
disability costs awarded to age 25, when the court expected the son to move into a state-funded group 
home). 
37
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003).  Useful 
summary and analysis is given in: J Seymour, Cattanach v Melchior: Legal Principles and Public Policy  
11(3) Torts LJ 208 (2003); and P Phillips, Medical Negligence and Wrongful Birth: Cattanach v Mel-
chior — A Discussion of the Medical, Legal and Policy Issues, 15(3) INSURANCE L.J. 203 (2004). 
38
  CES v. Superclinics (1995) 38 NSWLR 47 (NSW Supreme Court, 1995). 
39
  Dahl v. Purnell (1992) 15 Qld Lawyer Reps 33 (healthy child); Veivers v. Connolly [1995] 2 Qd.R 
326 (Townsville SC) (disabled child); Melchior v Cattanach [2000] QSC 285; (2001) Aust Torts Reports 
¶81-597 (Queensland Supreme Court, 2001) (healthy child); Melchior v Cattanach [2001] QCA 246 
(Queensland Court of Appeal, 2001); see also Murray v Whiting [2002] QSC 257 (Queensland Supreme 
Court, 2002). 
40
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003) [11]-
[12] (Gleeson CJ). 
41
  Melchior v. Cattanach, [2000] QSC 285; (2001) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-597 (Queensland Supreme 
Court, 2000). 
42
  Melchior v. Cattanach [2001] QCA 246 (QLD Court of Appeal). 
43
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003) 
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The Cattanach majority held that upbringing costs are recoverable on normal 
principles;44 that there should be no set-off between financial costs and emo-
tional benefits, since these affect different interests;45 and that the policy argu-
ments against full recovery are unpersuasive. 
McHugh and Gummow JJ appeared to treat the plaintiffs’ loss as pure economic 
loss, stating ‘the relevant damage suffered by the [plaintiffs] is the expenditure 
that they have incurred or will incur in the future’46 (though they suggested the 
outcome did not depend on this classification47).  They noted the danger of 
relying on policy arguments48 that are empirically unfounded or that slide 
impermissibly from broad statements of widely held values to the conclusion 
that upbringing costs are unrecoverable.49  Kirby J characterised the plaintiffs’ 
economic loss not as pure but as consequential upon the physical damage of 
unwanted pregnancy.50  He noted that policy arguments against full recovery, 
including those of the Cattanach minority,51 rely on controversial values, unsup-
ported assumptions, or are legally irrelevant.  Callinan J held the plaintiffs’ 
economic loss was pure rather than consequential,52 but saw the case as ‘a rela-
tively simple one’53 where the requirements for recovery of pure economic loss 
are met and the opposing policy arguments are weak:54 a judge’s ‘distaste’ 
cannot override legal principle.55  The majority also warned that a new form of 
                                                           
44
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [51] & 
[71]-[72] (McHugh and Gummow JJ), [176] & [179] (Kirby J), [299] (Callinan J).  See also: Melchior v. 
Cattanach [2001] QCA 246, (QLD Court of Appeal, 2001) [83] (Davies JA); McFarlane v. Tayside 
Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961 (House of Lords, 1999); [2000] 2 AC 59, 74C-D (UK House of 
Lords, 2000) (Lord Slynn), 82E & 84C-E (Lord Steyn), 107B-C (Lord Millett); Parkinson v. St James 
and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530; [2001] 3 All ER 97, 118b-c (Hale 
LJ); Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 88; [2002] All ER 177, 189b 
(Waller LJ); Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] 1 QB 
1012, 1028E-F (Purchas LJ); [1984] 3 All ER 1044 (CA). 
45
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [87]-
[90] (McHugh and Gummow JJ); [103]-[105] (Kirby J); [297]-[298] (Callinan J). 
46
  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003) [67] 
(McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
47
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [66] & 
[72] (McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
48
  For example:  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 
2003) [35] (Gleeson CJ); Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, (House of 
Lords, 2003) [16] (Lord Nicholls). 
49
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [77] 
(McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
50
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [148] 
(Kirby J). 
51
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [149], 
[151], [154], [176] (Kirby J). 
52
   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [299] 
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legal immunity would be given to doctors and hospitals if shielded from the 
consequences of their negligence.56 
The minority judges assumed, virtually without supporting argument,57 that 
damages must be offset for any emotional benefits the child will bring.  They 
held58 that financially estimating those benefits, and thus allegedly treating them 
as a commodity, creates problems of ‘legal coherence’59 because it runs contrary 
to the law’s assumptions about ‘desirable paradigm[s] of family relationships’60 
and ‘key values in family life’.61 
On other matters the minority differed.  Gleeson CJ saw the plaintiffs’ loss as 
pure economic loss,62 and held that if recovery of upbringing costs were allowed 
then liability could potentially extend past age 18 to weddings, tertiary educa-
tion, and so on.63  He concluded that liability for upbringing costs would be 
indeterminate (incapable of calculation or non-arbitrary limitation), and would 
therefore be denied on normal principles, since normal principles do not permit 
recovery of indeterminate amounts for pure economic loss.64  Hayne J, on the 
other hand, held the economic loss was consequential65 and that normal princi-
ples permit recovery.66 He noted that most policy arguments against recovery are 
weak but he ultimately found the ‘paradigms’ argument persuasive.67 
Heydon J did not discuss whether the plaintiffs’ economic loss was pure or 
consequential, or whether normal principles permit recovery, but instead 
launched a litany of policy arguments against recovery, based largely on the 
assumption that parents will happily denounce their child or formulate elaborate 
fictions in order to secure maximum compensation.  The overall argument 
seemed to be that since (as Heydon J thought) most wrongful birth plaintiffs will 
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 Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [59] 
(McHugh and Gummow JJ), [149] & [179] (Kirby J), [295] (Callinan J). 
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 But cf Cattanach Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Austra-
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   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [35] 
(Gleeson CJ). 
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   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [258] 
(Hayne J). 
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   Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [322] 
(Heydon J). 
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  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [39] 
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  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [193] 
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  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, (High Court of Australia 2003) [192] 
(Hayne J). 
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  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003), [195]-
[222] (Hayne J). 
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act dishonestly and in ways that undermine family values, wrongful birth actions 
should be disallowed.  This was perhaps the weakest Cattanach judgment, since 
it attempts to override ordinary principles and enforce controversial ‘values in 
family life’68 by asserting empirically unsupported speculations about the mo-
tives and dispositions of potential litigants. It is thus a use of judicial power for 
‘the furthering of some political, moral or social program’ (a program supporting 
those ‘values’), and so exhibits what some would label, and perhaps rightly 
decry, as ‘judicial activism’.69 
It will now be argued that normal principles permit full recovery with no set-off 
(Section 2); and that there are no persuasive policy grounds for accepting a 
different option (Section 3).  Full recovery is therefore the ‘correct’, or most 
defensible, position at law. 
B Do Normal Tort Principles Support Recovery for Dam-
ages? 
1  What are ‘normal’ principles of negligence? 
‘Normal’70 or ‘ordinary’71 tort principles contrast in some way with policy con-
siderations.  However, two types of policy consideration are relevant in negli-
gence.  First, policy considerations may focus on the actions, events and 
connections between defendant and potential plaintiffs, and ask whether these 
make it reasonable to attribute duty of care, breach of duty, causation and re-
moteness.72  Second, policy considerations may go beyond those actions, events 
and connections and consider, in light of further relationships or social factors, 
whether attributing liability is socially or morally desirable.73  ‘Normal’ princi-
ples appear to be those excluding the second category of policy consideration.74 
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(Mason CJ; Gaudron J agreeing), 435-6 (Deane J; Gaudron J agreeing), 436 (Toohey J). 
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  Giannarelli & Shulkes v. Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; (1988) 81 ALR 417 (High Court of Australia, 
1988); Gala v. Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; (1991) 100 ALR 29. (High Court of Australia, 1991). 
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  See also: Melchior v Cattanach [2001] QCA 246, (Queensland Court of Appeal, 2001) [36] 
(McMurdo P). 
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2  Normal principles applied to wrongful birth 
On normal principles, a defendant is liable for: (a) physical damage—damage to 
person or property—that is reasonably foreseeable, reasonably preventable and 
caused by his conduct;75 and (b) reasonably foreseeable kinds of damage caused 
by that physical damage.76   
Assume for now that unwanted pregnancy is physical damage.  Concerning (a), 
unwanted pregnancy involving a healthy or disabled child is reasonably foresee-
able, reasonably preventable (say, by warning that sterilisation may reverse), 
and—in relevant cases—caused by the doctor’s conduct (such as failure to 
warn). 
Concerning (b), pregnancy and upbringing costs are reasonably foreseeable 
kinds of damage flowing from unwanted pregnancy, since they are the very 
kinds of damage likely to result.  Failure to abort or adopt out the child will not 
sever causation between the breach and upbringing costs, since keeping the child 
is a foreseeable and non-negligent consequence of the breach;77 indeed, failure to 
abort or adopt out is precisely a failure to interrupt the causal chain.78  Nor can 
failure to abort or adopt out be seen as an unreasonable failure to mitigate dam-
age, since abortion and adoption are sensitive matters of individual conscience 
and courts are rightly loath to find such failure unreasonable.79 
Thus, assuming unwanted pregnancy is physical damage, the negligent doctor—
whether the child is healthy or disabled—is liable on normal principles for 
pregnancy and upbringing costs.   
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  Wyong Shire Council v. Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 (High Court of Australia, 1980); March v. E & MH 
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  Melchior v Cattanach [2000] QSC 285, (Queensland Supreme Court, 2000) [57] (Holmes J); (2001) 
Aust Torts Reports ¶81-597 Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court 
of Australia, 2003),, [161] (Kirby J); McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961; [2000] 2 
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(Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47, (NSW Supreme Court, 1995) 79B-D (Kirby ACJ); Emeh v. 
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] 1 QB 1012, 1019E-F (Waller 
LJ), 1024G-1025A (Slade LJ), 1027D-E (Purchas LJ); [1984] 3 All ER 1044 (CA).  Contra: CES v 
Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47, (NSW Supreme Court, 1995) 84G-85A 
(Priestley JA). 
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  Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38 (High Court of Australia, 2003),, [220]-
[222] (Hayne J), [301] (Callinan J); Melchior v. Cattanach [2000] QSC 285, (Queensland Supreme 
Court, 2001) [57] (Holmes J); (2001) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-597; McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board 
[1999] 4 All ER 961; [2000] 2 AC 59 (UK House of Lords, 2000), 81D-F (Lord Steyn), 113A-B (Lord 
Millett); Kealey v Berezowski (1996) 136 DLR (4th) 708, 740g-741b; CES v Superclinics (Australia) 
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3 Pure or consequential economic loss? 
If unwanted pregnancy is not physical damage, then pregnancy costs of a finan-
cial nature, and upbringing costs, are all pure economic loss (because consequent 
upon a condition—unwanted pregnancy—that is not physical damage) and 
recovery on normal principles will be harder to establish.80 
It is submitted that ‘physical damage’ should be taken to include any substantial 
invasion of bodily interests.  Bodily autonomy—the right to decide what hap-
pens in and to one’s body—is a legally protected interest.81  Unwanted preg-
nancy substantially invades this bodily interest by introducing profound bodily 
changes to which one does not consent.82  Unwanted pregnancy therefore is 
physical damage, even though pregnancy is in some sense a ‘natural’ phenome-
non.83  Thus, Kirby J in Cattanach held wrongful birth involves ‘direct [physi-
cal] injury to the parents, certainly to the mother who suffered profound and 
unwanted physical events (pregnancy and child-birth) involving her person’, so 
that ‘[a]ny [resulting] economic loss was not pure, but consequential’.84  It 
would follow that any part of a wrongful birth claim brought (only) by the 
mother is a claim for consequential loss; while any part brought (only) by the 
father is, it seems, a claim for pure economic loss, since the loss is caused by 
physical damage to a third party (the mother). 
What if part of a claim—generally the component for upbringing costs—is 
brought jointly by both parents?  Judges in McFarlane85 and Cattanach86 held a 
joint claim is for pure economic loss, since the father is part of the claim and 
suffers no physical injury: “From his point of view, how could the claim be 
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anything other than a claim for pure economic loss?”87  Yet equally, from the 
mother’s point of view, how could the claim be anything other than a claim for 
consequential loss?  It is not clear, and seems chauvinistic to hold, that the 
father’s view should automatically take priority.  Further, as Kirby J noted, the 
requirement that plaintiffs suffer physical damage in order to recover in negli-
gence stems from a concern to avoid indeterminate liability; and, so long as at 
least one plaintiff suffers physical damage, that concern is met.88  Accordingly, a 
joint claim should be seen as one for consequential loss. 
In short: since unwanted pregnancy is physical damage, the doctor, on normal 
principles, is liable to the mother, or to mother and father jointly, for pregnancy 
and upbringing costs. 
4  Pure economic loss and wrongful birth 
The requirements for recovery of pure economic loss are described in Perre.89  
These requirements must be met if, contra the above, unwanted pregnancy is not 
physical damage, or in any case where the father claims alone. 
Separate judgments in Perre leave no single ratio, but the main factors identified 
as creating a duty of care were:90 known reliance;91 vulnerability;92 control;93 
knowledge of the risk and its magnitude;94 an ascertainable class of plaintiffs;95 
non-interference with existing law;96 and non-interference with legitimate com-
mercial interests.97  The point of identifying these factors is to avoid the imposi-
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tion of liability “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class”.’98 
Typically in wrongful birth, the doctor knows the parents will rely on his or her 
advice or expertise.  The parents are vulnerable (unable to protect their own 
interests) because they lack specialist medical knowledge and must rely entirely 
on the doctor to provide such knowledge (and thereby to protect their interests); 
it is unrealistic to expect them to protect their interests by negotiating a contract 
under which the doctor or hospital will pay for upbringing costs.99  Similarly, the 
doctor is in control, since his or her conduct will effectively determine whether 
the parents’ interests (for example, in avoiding childbirth) will be protected or 
infringed.  The doctor typically knows of the risk of pregnancy and its magni-
tude (that it will cause substantial costs, especially if the child turns out dis-
abled).  The parents are an ascertainable class known to the doctor: they are at 
particular risk of damage from the doctor’s conduct, since only they will have to 
bear, whether jointly or severally, the costs of any resulting child (or rather, they 
and the child will bear those costs: the costs of caring for the child are gratuitous 
care costs and thus are treated as also incurred by the child himself100).  Impos-
ing a duty of care does not interfere with existing law (since no well-developed 
laws yet apply to the birth torts) or with legitimate commercial interests (since 
imposing the duty merely holds the doctor to the standard of care already ex-
pected in law and society, and there is no legitimate interest in breaching that 
standard). 
Although these factors are met—and thus although liability for wrongful birth 
would appear to be determinate—Gleeson CJ in Cattanach held that liability for 
upbringing costs would be indeterminate.  His concerns: (1) ‘Parents might go 
through their lives making financial and other arrangements…to accommodate 
the needs or reasonable requirements of their children’; it is not clear when such 
arrangements would count as economic loss.101  (2) It is not clear when liability 
would end: children are often dependent on their parents past age 18, so liability 
could in principle extend to weddings, tertiary education, and so on (albeit that 
these were not part of the claim in Cattanach).102  (3) If upbringing costs are 
recoverable, damages for ‘adverse effects on career prospects’ must be too—and 
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these ‘might far exceed the costs of raising and maintaining a child’.103  (4) 
Upbringing costs would have to be discounted since the child may provide 
financial assistance later in life.104 
Ground (1), however, would equally have denied recovery in Perre.  There, the 
defendant caused the plaintiff to be prohibited from exporting potatoes for five 
years.105  During this time the plaintiffs might equally have made ‘financial and 
other arrangements’ to accommodate the prohibition.  When would this count as 
economic loss?  A difficult question, perhaps—but no Perre judge considered 
this a reason to deny recovery.  Moreover, the question has a clear answer in 
wrongful birth: upbringing costs, it can be held, cover actual or likely expendi-
ture on goods or services procured for the child’s benefit; they do not cover 
arrangements designed to generate the funds used to procure those goods and 
services.  Concerning (2), liability would end when the child, on the facts, ‘might 
[reasonably] be expected to be economically self-reliant’.106  Weddings and 
tertiary education could be included107 if these were prior to reasonable self-
reliance and were reasonable rather than extravagant expenses.108  Concerning 
(3), a claim for loss of earnings (as part of a larger claim for upbringing costs) 
would be treated straightforwardly as any other claim for loss of earnings.  
Concerning (4), evidence of likely financial assistance could indeed produce a 
discount.109  Nothing in (1)-(4) shows liability for upbringing costs would be to 
or for an indeterminate amount, time or class. 
A further worry about indeterminate liability is this:110 through the new child’s 
birth, siblings may receive less pocket money and presents, while relatives 
babysitting the child may lose income from more profitable activities.  Could 
they sue for pure economic loss?  It seems not.111  Other parties might suffer just 
as much loss: toy stores, video stores, clothes stores and restaurants, since the 
parents have less money to spend on luxuries; the mother’s employer, who must 
find a replacement during maternity leave; the parents’ friends, who must buy 
more meals because the parents do not treat them to dinner so often; and so on.  
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Such losses are reasonably foreseeable, but the members of the class are in 
practice impossible to determine.  So once the zone of liability is extended 
beyond the parents (or rather, parents and child—a non-arbitrary class at particu-
lar risk from the doctor’s conduct), it becomes indeterminate and must be disal-
lowed.112 
Thus, the parents and child—but only the parents and child—satisfy the Perre 
requirements.  Hence even if financial pregnancy and upbringing costs are pure 
economic loss, doctors in typical wrongful birth cases have a duty to prevent that 
loss.  So, on normal principles, doctors in such cases will be liable to the plain-
tiffs—mother, father, or both jointly—for financial pregnancy and upbringing 
costs.113  A claim for pure economic loss cannot, of course, include damages for 
pain and suffering. 
5 Offsetting benefits and harms 
On normal principles, should the net value of emotional benefits brought to the 
parents by the child be estimated in financial terms and offset against the dam-
ages (if any) for pregnancy and upbringing costs?  The Cattanach majority held 
not.  McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ114 noted Dixon J’s statement in Zoanetti: 
‘when one of two separate interests is benefited in consequence of a wrongful 
act, the benefit cannot be set off against an injury to the other.’115  McHugh and 
Gummow JJ continued: 
The coal miner, forced to retire because of injury, does not get less dam-
ages for loss of earning capacity [or pain and suffering] because he is now 
free to sit in the sun each day reading his favourite newspaper.  Likewise, 
the award of damages to the parents for their future financial expenditure 
[or pain and suffering] is not to be reduced by the enjoyment that they 
will or may obtain from the birth of the child.116 
The exception would be damages for loss of enjoyment of life: these could, if 
claimed, be set off against emotional benefits, since the same interest is in-
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volved.117  Kirby118 and Callinan119 JJ reasoned similarly. Gleeson CJ, however, 
rejected the miner example as circular: 
[The miner’s] loss of earning capacity, a recognised head of damages, is 
not mitigated by his enforced leisure.  [In wrongful birth], however, the 
question is whether human reproduction and the creation of a parent-child 
relationship is actionable damage.120 
In other words: to apply the Zoanetti rule, one must already assume that the 
parent-child relationship—or, more accurately, the financial costs flowing from 
it121—are a recognised head of damages; yet to make that assumption is circular, 
since the very question at stake is whether those costs should be recognised as a 
head of damages. 
This charge of circularity is misplaced. The miner example shows that, on nor-
mal principles, damages for pain, suffering and economic loss are not reduced 
for any emotional benefits brought by the negligence.  To apply this to wrongful 
birth, one assumes—what is taken to be shown on other grounds—that damages 
for pregnancy and upbringing costs are recoverable on normal principles; one 
then concludes that these damages are not to be reduced for any emotional 
benefits brought by the child.  Hence, what the example assumes is not that 
upbringing costs are ultimately recoverable—that really would be circular—but 
merely that they are recoverable on normal principles.  This is not circular.  So 
the miner example does show there should be no offset for emotional benefits. 
Of course, the birth of the child may also bring the parents financial benefits, 
such as statutory welfare benefits.122  On normal principles, financial benefits 
caused by the negligence are offset against financial costs.  There is, however, 
no offset for gifts or insurance payouts,123 and in the case of statutory benefits an 
offset will depend on the intention of the legislation conferring the benefit.124  
Thus, a reduction in pregnancy and upbringing costs for statutory benefits may 
be appropriate; but examining the relevant legislation is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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On normal principles, then, the doctor in wrongful birth will be liable for preg-
nancy costs and upbringing costs (though with no damages for pain and suffer-
ing if the claim is for pure economic loss); and there should be no offset between 
pregnancy and upbringing costs on the one hand, and emotional benefits on the 
other (though there should perhaps be an offset for statutory benefits).  In short, 
ordinary principles permit—indeed require—full recovery with no set-off. 
C Are There Sound Policy Arguments against Recovery?  
Full recovery with no set-off is often rejected for policy reasons.  The main 
policy arguments will be considered by subject-matter: (1) the value of the child 
and family relationships; (2) justice and proportionality; (3) miscellaneous.  It 
will be asked, of each argument, what damages 125 would result if the argument 
were accepted; but it will be shown that each should be rejected. 
1 The value of the child and family relationships 
(a)  The ‘blessing’ argument 
A child’s existence has been held a ‘blessing’, a benefit to the parents, who thus 
could not have suffered any loss or damage (at least not any overall loss or 
damage), and so have no cause of action in negligence.  That is, although a child 
brings harms as well as benefits, ‘the benefits must be regarded as outweighing 
any loss.’126 
This argument, originating in the US,127 has been rejected128 more than ac-
cepted.129  Four problems with it emerge.  First, the argument contradicts normal 
principles by assuming that emotional benefits can be offset against—and so 
‘outweigh’—financial and other costs.  As argued, normal principles permit no 
such offset. 
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Second, the argument entails there can be no recovery for wrongful birth: as 
there is no damage overall—as any loss is ‘outweighed’ by the emotional bene-
fits of raising a child—therefore no damages would be recoverable.130  This 
seems unjust: prima facie, it would be more just to award some damages to the 
plaintiffs rather than no damages at all. 
Third, measures to avoid childbirth—abstinence, abortion, the ‘rhythm’ method, 
contraception, and sterilisation—are used at some time by many heterosexual 
people precisely because they believe (correctly) that there are circumstances 
where having an extra child, even a healthy child, would not benefit the parents 
overall.131  If every child were a blessing, the goal of life during one’s fertile 
years would be ‘unlimited child bearing,’132 for each procreation would leave 
one better off.  As this is manifestly absurd—there is more to life than procrea-
tion—not every child is a benefit.  Also, that particular parents decide to keep 
the child does not mean they regard it as a blessing:133 they may rather feel that, 
while no child would have been best, keeping the child is better, morally or 
emotionally, than abortion or adoption. 
Fourth, difficulties arise in severe disability.  Parents whose relationships and 
life-plans are dashed because they must constantly care for a severely disabled 
child have plainly not benefited overall from the child’s existence.  There would, 
as with every child, be particular benefits, some joys; but, overall, the parents 
are worse off: it would be better for the parents if the child had never existed.  
So, not every child is a blessing.   
Proponents of the ‘blessing’ argument might then reply that only ‘normal, 
healthy’134 children are necessarily beneficial to their parents.  But this is equally 
inconsistent with widespread anti-procreative measures, and is discriminatory.135  
It is discriminatory because many disabled children are more beneficial to their 
parents than many healthy children; and so to deny all disabled children the 
privileged status of ‘necessarily beneficial’ is unjust discrimination—denial of a 
privilege on the basis of a general characteristic (disability) while ignoring 
relevant differences between cases. 
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(b) Estimation, commodification, denigration 
It is said that to determine the plaintiff’s overall loss one must estimate in finan-
cial terms the net value of emotional benefits the child will provide to the par-
ents, and then offset this amount against the financial losses the parents suffer.136  
But, it is said, one cannot financially estimate the value of a human relation-
ship.137  Even if one could, financially estimating the child’s value to the parents 
is contrary to key legal and moral values because it treats the child as a commod-
ity.138  Further, parents, in an attempt to reduce the offset, would be induced to 
denigrate their child: they would urge, and courts might accept, the ‘unedifying 
proposition’139 that the emotional benefits are very small, that the child is more 
trouble financially than it is worth emotionally.140  Since, therefore, the emo-
tional benefits cannot, or at least should not, be estimated, the plaintiffs cannot 
show whether or to what extent they have suffered overall loss, and so no recov-
ery—at least of upbringing expenses—should be permitted.141 
Like the ‘blessing’ argument, this argument fails by assuming, against normal 
principles, that an offset should be made for emotional benefits.  The other steps 
are therefore irrelevant—but also unpersuasive.  Financially estimating emo-
tional benefits is hardly impossible given the law’s routine estimation of ‘nebu-
lous items such as pain and suffering and loss of reputation.’142  Such estimation 
does not treat the child as a commodity, but merely treats the benefits as roughly 
financially estimable in order to determine just compensation.  If this unaccepta-
bly ‘commodifies’ the parent-child relationship, then financial estimation of 
gratuitous care services must likewise ‘commodify’ the gratuitous carer-cared 
relationship.  Yet damages for gratuitous care are allowed.143 
The proposition that a child costs more financially than it is worth emotionally is 
unedifying but irrelevant.  The appropriate set-off, if there is to be one, is not 
between financial costs and emotional benefits, but between financial and non-
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financial costs and emotional benefits.  Non-financial costs include the pain and 
suffering of pregnancy, plus substantial emotional costs: loss of reproductive 
autonomy;144 loss or postponement of life-plans and career goals; and the incon-
venience—such as tantrums—of bringing up a child.  In most cases where a child 
is not planned, these emotional costs could reasonably be held of themselves to 
outweigh emotional benefits.145  A court worried about denigration could then 
deliberately overestimate the child’s emotional benefits by deeming, whether the 
child is healthy or disabled, that emotional benefits equal emotional costs146 (this 
may be called the ‘overestimation’ solution).  Since emotional benefits and emo-
tional costs would thus cancel each other out, other categories of loss—pregnancy 
costs (including pain and suffering) and upbringing costs—would still be fully 
recoverable with no further set-off.  This solution overestimates the child’s emo-
tional benefits but still allows the parents to recover the costs resulting from the 
negligence; hence it is more just than a solution that, by refusing to estimate emo-
tional benefits, leaves the victims of negligence uncompensated.  The ‘overestima-
tion’ solution also eliminates ‘commodification’ worries, since emotional benefits 
are compared with emotional costs, not money.  Further, any incentive to denigrate 
the child is removed, since the offset is conclusively deemed and denigration will 
not reduce it. 
Unless this ‘overestimation’ solution is adopted, ‘commodification’ arguments 
entail there must be no recovery for wrongful birth.147  The reason is that, if 
emotional benefits are to be set off against financial costs occurring after birth 
(as ‘commodification’ arguments assume), those benefits must also as a matter 
of consistency be set off against financial costs, pain and suffering occurring 
before birth: there is no principled reason why there would be an offset against 
one but not the other.  Since the emotional benefits allegedly cannot or should 
not be estimated, the plaintiffs would be barred from showing whether or to what 
extent they have suffered overall loss at all (whether before or after birth).  
Hence they would not be entitled to recover at all: not even for pain, suffering, 
or extra disability costs,148 since these items (barring an unprincipled and arbi-
trary exception149) would equally be subject to set-off against inestimable emo-
tional benefits.  Thus, if a set-off is allowed and ‘commodification’ worries are 
accepted, the choice is between the ‘overestimation’ solution and no recovery.  
‘Overestimation’ is more just. 
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In sum, ‘commodification’ arguments are irrelevant because normal principles 
permit no set-off.  If set-off were permitted, the ‘overestimation’ solution should 
be adopted, which would leave pregnancy and upbringing costs recoverable. 
(c) Harm and distress to the child 
Another common argument150 claims that recovery of damages, or at any rate 
upbringing costs, should be disallowed because the child may suffer distress on 
discovering, through the court’s official pronouncement, that they were un-
planned; that the parents sued for pregnancy and/or upbringing costs; that the 
parents believed they would have been better off without the child; that the child 
was raised with funds supplied by a doctor; or (in some cases, based on the 
difference between the damages awarded and the sort of upbringing the child 
knows he actually had) that the parents failed to spend the damages for the 
child’s benefit. 
This argument fails on several counts.  First, it is not clear how ‘the possibility 
of detriment to a person not party to the action’—the child—could ‘prevent 
recovery of damages’.151  That an action distresses the defendant’s (or even 
plaintiff’s) spouse, for example, is not a reason to deny compensation. 
Second, judicial pronouncements of likely harm lack empirical evidence;152 
while weaker claims of a mere risk of harm153 do not justify outright denial of 
compensation, since the certain harm to parents in denying compensation may 
well exceed the merely possible harm to children in granting it. 
Third, distress to the child would generally be outweighed by the substantial 
benefit—security of upbringing—provided by damages.154 
Fourth, ‘there are many harsher truths’155 children may discover than that they 
were unplanned; the discovery is common and outweighed by subsequent 
love.156  Knowledge that the parents sued will not cause distress if it is explained 
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that this was merely to avoid certain financial costs and was done for the child’s 
benefit:157 ‘Because we love you, we wanted to ensure we could afford a good 
upbringing.’  Of course, one cannot completely ‘negate the risk of an irrational 
reaction’ from the child;158 but then, denying compensation might equally pro-
duce irrational reactions from children who become angry that their parents 
brought them into the world without knowing they could obtain the means to 
support them. 
Fifth, the risk of harm (if there is one) will vary between cases, so respect for 
privacy and autonomy would require that parents, not courts, be left to decide if 
suing will harm the child.  To hold that the parents’ ‘conflict between duty and 
interest’—duty not to harm the child, self-interest in compensation—should be 
‘removed’ because the parents cannot be trusted to resolve it fairly159 is paternal-
istic and inaccurate. 
Sixth, if no offset is allowed for emotional benefits,160 or if an offset is allowed 
and the ‘overestimation’ solution is adopted, then there is no suggestion the 
parents are emotionally worse off through the child’s existence; merely that they 
are financially worse off (which is obvious and inoffensive).  In any case, it is 
precisely if the court fails to award damages that the parents may be worse off 
because of the child.  An award of damages would itself be a benefit flowing 
from the child’s existence, and would ensure the parents are not worse off. 
Seventh, knowledge that upbringing costs came from a doctor would be no more 
distressing than knowledge that they came from lottery winnings, or a kindly 
stranger.  The funds come from a doctor, but thereupon become the parents’, and 
the child will happily enjoy the benefits that flow from them.  If the parents 
invest the damages imperfectly, the child will enjoy less than the full benefit;161 
but invariably the child will still benefit substantially162—and, as long as this is 
so, the child is unlikely to be overly distressed about how much more money 
should have been spent. 
Finally, the ‘distress’ argument, like ‘blessing’ and ‘commodification’, entails 
there must be no recovery for wrongful birth.  So long as some damages are 
recoverable, the child may read the court’s judgment and discover he was un-
planned and that the parents sued for associated costs—a discovery that can be 
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prevented only by barring recovery completely.163  This, however, seems plainly 
unjust.  The assertion (made in an attempt to avoid this injustice) that recovery of 
pregnancy costs might nevertheless be allowed as ‘a not unreasonable compro-
mise’164 simply ignores the inconsistency between that compromise and the 
‘distress’ argument. 
2 Justice and proportionality 
(a)  Intuitions about justice and assumption of responsibility 
To some judges, recovery of upbringing costs is intuitively inappropriate.  The 
fact that the doctor would have to pay for food and entertainment is said to 
‘prompt questions as to the nature of the entire claim’.165  Or it is said most 
people would ‘[i]nstinctively’ think an award of upbringing costs immoral.166  
Such intuitions, however, are too controversial to justify a departure from normal 
principles:167 ‘Intuitive feelings for justice seem a poor substitute for a rule 
antecedently known, more particularly where all do not have the same intui-
tions.’168  Equally unconvincing is the claim that ‘[t]he doctor does not assume 
responsibility’ for upbringing costs.169  If this means the doctor does not inten-
tionally assume responsibility, then it is irrelevant, since intention is not an 
element of negligence; while if it is simply an assertion, based on intuition, that 
the doctor has no legal responsibility for upbringing costs, then this assumes 
what is at stake.170  In any case, intuition-based arguments can have even less 
force in Australia, where policy considerations have less prominence.171 
 Any option on damages could be supported by appeal to intuition: one 
simply asserts the chosen option is ‘intuitively correct’.  But intuition-based 
arguments against recovery of upbringing costs are unpersuasive because they 
merely state a conclusion without justifying it—without identifying, in other 
words, the features and principles that make an award of upbringing costs inap-
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propriate.  This unprincipled approach has led, in the UK, to confusion and 
arbitrariness.172 
(b)  Proportionality and moderation of damages 
In Cattanach, Heydon J warned that ‘if the law permits recovery [of upbringing 
costs] at all, damages will be sought [and awarded] in immoderate amounts 
which may become…unreasonable.’173  ‘Rich parents’ might seek to recover ‘the 
cost of expensive clothes, toys, pastimes, presents and parties of the type which 
the planned siblings of the unplanned child had enjoyed or were going to en-
joy.’174  Claims for house extensions, larger family cars, boarding school, up-
bringing past age 18, and tertiary education—perhaps at Princeton—might 
likewise produce very substantial damages.175  Heydon J did not see this as ‘in 
itself necessarily an argument against recovery’176 (why he mentioned it is thus 
unclear), but others have argued that ‘the expense of child rearing would be 
wholly disproportionate to the doctor’s culpability’.177  That is, ‘the extent of the 
liability’, if upbringing costs were awarded, would be ‘disproportionate to…the 
extent of the negligence.’178  This argument, if accepted, would justify awarding 
pregnancy costs without upbringing costs (since pregnancy costs are presumably 
not ‘disproportionate’ to culpability).  It would preclude recovery of extra dis-
ability costs, since these would often exceed the already ‘disproportionate’ 
upbringing costs of a normal child.179 
Despite certain isolated statements,180 there is no common law principle that 
damages must be proportionate to culpability.  Particularly where vulnerable 
people are injured, ‘the damages recoverable may [greatly exceed] the tortfea-
sor’s initial culpability’.181  In Rogers v Whitaker,182 for example, the defen-
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dant’s negligence involved failure to disclose a 1 in 14,000 risk of sympathetic 
opthalmia—a risk many specialists of his kind would also not have disclosed.  
This barely culpable failure brought damages, in 1992, of $808,564.38.  Any 
principle of proportionality would have excluded that amount.  More generally, 
acceptance in Australia of the ‘egg shell skull’ rule shows that damages are 
limited by remoteness, not magnitude;183 hence there is no general principle of 
proportionality.184  The spectre of extravagant claims is thus a mere ‘useful 
polemical device’,185 ‘irrelevant to legal principle’.186 
In any case, extravagant claims face difficulties.  Plaintiffs are compensated for 
reasonable, not ideal, requirements.187 Thus in Sharman the plaintiff, a quadri-
plegic, was awarded damages based on future life in hospital rather than 
(greater) damages for future life at home.  The claim for damages based on life 
at home was unreasonable because life at home would merely increase her 
happiness, not her health.188  Had life at home been expected to increase her 
health, a cost-benefit analysis would follow: if cost is high and benefits specula-
tive, or if less expenditure would produce almost the same benefit, then that part 
of the claim is unreasonable.189 
Adapting this to wrongful birth, it appears upbringing costs would be limited to 
preservation of the child’s health: that which merely increases happiness is 
unreasonable. However, Cattanach went beyond this, allowing $200 for an 
overseas holiday.190  Perhaps the reasonable view is that upbringing costs are 
limited to what is reasonably necessary for the child’s reasonable, rather than 
ideal, welfare.  There is a lack of authority here; but a three-step test could apply.  
First, consider the level of welfare the plaintiffs plan to give the child (as re-
flected in the claim for damages), and ask whether this level of welfare, by the 
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standards of modern Australian society, is reasonable rather than ideal or ex-
travagant.  To the extent it is ideal or extravagant, the claim is unreasonable.  
Exclusive private schooling, a Princeton education, a Ferrari on one’s 18th birth-
day, or frequent overseas holidays, would all be excluded on this basis. 
Second, ask whether it is reasonably necessary for the plaintiffs to purchase the 
claimed items in order to achieve the planned level of welfare.  The claim is 
unreasonable to the extent that: 
• the plaintiffs could achieve the same level of welfare for the child by 
buying fewer or less expensive items; 
• the claimed items involve substantial cost with little increase in welfare; 
or  
• the child, by the standards of modern Australian society, could reasona-
bly pay for an item himself. 
So for example if, on the evidence, state schooling would be virtually as benefi-
cial as private schooling, the cost of the latter would be disallowed.  Also, the 
child in most cases can reasonably pay for tertiary education (via HECS) and at 
least most of the cost of a wedding (through earnings), so these would not be 
recoverable. 
Third, one would ask whether the claimed upbringing items correspond to the 
plaintiffs’ pre-negligence socio-economic level.  To the extent that the claim for 
damages contemplates a wealthier upbringing than a child born to such plaintiffs 
would ordinarily expect, the claim is unreasonable, since it would, if accepted, 
cause the plaintiffs to increase their socio-economic position and so profit from 
the negligence.191  However, no claim is unreasonable if it reflects the minimum 
necessary to meet the plaintiffs’ legal obligations to the child. 
In short, it is incorrect to say a restriction to ‘moderate’ and ‘reasonable’ dam-
ages is ‘wholly unsound in law.’192  Claims for damages cannot be extravagant 
or ideal, and so are confined to what is ‘reasonable’—though ‘reasonable’ may 
still be substantial. 
 
3 Miscellaneous policy arguments 
(a)  Exaggeration of habits and weaknesses 
Following his discovery that ‘[p]ersonal injury litigation…is not fought in an 
altruistic way’,193 Heydon J feared that if recovery of upbringing costs were 
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permitted, plaintiffs would exaggerate ‘family habits’ (amounts spent on up-
bringing) and ‘children’s weaknesses’ (items requiring additional expenditure) in 
order to secure greater damages.194  Exaggeration could not be countered, as in 
other cases, by ‘objective assessments of medical science,’195 and may—to 
reprise the ‘distress’ argument—damage the child’s ‘self-esteem’,196 if by read-
ing the court’s judgment he learns of his weaknesses or fails to live up to exag-
gerated expectations.197 
The principle behind this argument appears to be that a given class of legal 
action—for example, wrongful birth actions—should be disallowed unless the 
risk of plaintiffs lying in order to secure greater compensation can be countered 
by ‘objective assessments of medical science’.  Any such principle, however, is 
refuted by ‘failure to warn’ cases.  The plaintiff must prove in such cases that 
he would have acted differently had proper warning been given.198  How the 
plaintiff would have acted depends on his beliefs, desires, temperament: mat-
ters generally incapable of objective medical assessment, so that any lies by 
the plaintiff about how he would have acted cannot be countered by ‘objective 
assessments of medical science’.  Yet, while courts are wary of the danger of 
self-serving testimony,199 recovery in ‘failure to warn’ cases is allowed.  As a 
matter of legal coherence, the same approach—allowing recovery while wary 
of exaggeration—should apply to wrongful birth.  In addition, there are checks 
on exaggeration in wrongful birth, as courts would rarely accept a child has 
weaknesses requiring substantial additional expenditure unless a qualified 
practitioner gave objective evidence to that effect. 
As for self-esteem, the child’s peers will already have pointed out any weak-
nesses,200 and so the court’s judgment tells him nothing new.  Similarly, parental 
expectations are usually expressed, so the child will already know if he has 
failed to live up to them; whereas if the expectations mentioned in the judgment 
have not since been mentioned, the child will realise they no longer are, or never 
were, held.  Either way, the judgment will hardly distress the child. 
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(b) Coherence with wrongful life claims 
Most common law jurisdictions disallow ‘wrongful life’ claims, where a dis-
abled child who owes his very existence to medical negligence sues the negli-
gent doctor for the costs of the disability.201  Two grounds are often cited: the 
sanctity of life; and the notion that the child suffers no damage through the 
negligence, because without the negligence he would not even exist.  It has been 
argued: 
[I]t might seem somewhat inconsistent to allow a [wrongful birth] claim 
by the parents while [a wrongful life claim by] the child, whether healthy 
or disabled, is rejected.  Surely the parents’ [wrongful birth] claim is 
equally repugnant to ideas of the sanctity and value of human life and 
rests, like that of the child, on a comparison between a situation where a 
human being exists and one where it does not.202 
It is incorrect, however, to ‘invoke the broad values which few would deny and 
then glide to the conclusion’ that they preclude the plaintiff’s claim.203  To say 
the child’s life results in compensable damage hardly commits one to saying the 
child’s life is not valuable or sacred.204  Moreover, the problem in wrongful life 
has been to show the plaintiff has suffered damage, given that without the negli-
gence he would not even exist.  This problem does not arise in wrongful birth, 
because without the negligence the plaintiff would still exist.  Finally, one can 
accept the alleged inconsistency and reverse the logic: since wrongful birth 
claims should be allowed, wrongful life claims should too.205  This, it will be 
argued, is the correct conclusion. 
 
4  Conclusion 
There are no rationally persuasive policy grounds for accepting any option 
other than that dictated by normal principles: full recovery with no set-off.  
Cattanach was therefore correctly decided, making denial of wrongful birth 
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claims ‘the business, if of anyone, of Parliament not the courts’.206  The 
almost hysterical reaction to Cattanach in some quarters is thus based not on 
sound legal principle but, it would seem, on two factors: general aversion to 
litigiousness (the suspicion, however misguided, that novel negligence ac-
tions are always driven by profit, and that wrongful birth plaintiffs must 
accordingly view their child as a mere cash fund); and religious dogma (the 
conviction that motherhood is the God-given or ‘natural’ state of women, so 
that children, ‘a gift from above’,207 must be treated at all times as a ‘bless-
ing’ and never as a basis for complaint or compensation).208  Neither factor 
provides a reason to depart from established legal principle. 
III WRONGFUL LIFE 
A Definitions and Approaches 
1 Wrongful life defined 
Wrongful life occurs where an unplanned disabled child owes his very existence 
to medical negligence: had the negligence not occurred, the child would never 
have been born.  The negligence may occur as for wrongful birth: negligent 
diagnosis or advice concerning sterilisation, pregnancy, disability or contracep-
tion; or negligent performance of sterilisation or abortion.209  Commonly, a 
doctor negligently fails to diagnose rubella, where diagnosis would have led to 
lawful210 termination: because the diagnosis is not made, a child is born with 
severe disabilities caused by the rubella.  In other cases the disability is genetic.  
The common feature is that, had proper diagnosis, advice, sterilisation or abor-
tion been given, the parents—who did not want a child, or at least not a disabled 
child—would have prevented or terminated the pregnancy, so the disabled child 
would never have been born.  (Wrongful life thus contrasts with more straight-
forward cases where, but for the negligence, the child would have been born 
without disability.) 
In a wrongful life action, the disabled child sues the negligent doctor in respect 
of the damage caused by the disability; this would generally include pain, suffer-
ing, and ‘disability costs’—the extra financial costs attributable to the disability, 
such as the cost of nursing care (these costs are ‘extra’ compared to the costs a 
non-disabled person would incur).  The label ‘wrongful life’ is an entrenched 
and convenient shorthand, though it also misleads: the notion that a person’s life 
could be wrongful is counterintuitive and renders the plaintiff’s claim suspect 
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from the outset.  What is wrongful is the negligence, not the child’s life;211 and it 
is precisely by focusing on the plaintiff’s life (as a whole), rather than on negli-
gent causation of physical damage, that courts have been led to misapply ordi-
nary principles and thus deny recovery. 
2 Options for recovery of damages 
The reasonable options appear to be: damages for pain, suffering, and disability 
costs; disability costs only; or no recovery.  It will be argued, however, that in 
extraordinary cases the child could also recover upbringing costs.  Economic 
losses—disability and upbringing costs—might or might not be offset against 
economic benefits the child will receive through such sources as employment 
and statutory welfare benefits. 
 
3  Existing authorities: UK, US and Canada 
In the UK, wrongful life claims were statute barred shortly after McKay,212 
leaving this as the leading authority.  McKay held that, while the doctor may owe 
a duty of care to the foetus (or rather, to the born person the foetus will become), 
no damage in wrongful life cases can be established.  To establish damage, one 
must show the plaintiff is worse off, on account of the negligence, than he would 
have been without it.  Yet, in wrongful life, the plaintiff would not even exist 
without the negligence.  Hence, for ‘damage’ to be suffered, the plaintiff would 
have to be worse off existing than not existing.  But comparing existence with 
non-existence (in order to say existence might be worse) is, it was held, impossi-
ble;213 so no damage can be established.  This ‘non-existence’ argument has been 
highly influential.  McKay also raised worries about children suing their parents 
for wrongful life,214 and the difficulty of specifying ‘how gravely deformed’ the 
child must be before a wrongful life claim would be recognised.215  The child’s 
claim was thus summarily dismissed. 
In the US, three states allow recovery of disability costs only,216 while others bar 
wrongful life actions for essentially the reasons in McKay.217 In Canada, wrong-
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lanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v Abelson 398 SE 2d 557 (1990)); Idaho (Blake v Cruz 698 P.2d 
315 (1984)); Illinois (Cockrum v Baumgartner 95 Ill. 2d 193, 200-01 (1983); Siemieniec v Lutheran 
General Hospital 512 NE 2d 691 (1987)); Indiana (Cowe v Forum Group, Inc 575 NE 2d 630 (1991); 
Kansas (Bruggeman v Schimke 718 P.2d 635 (1986)); Louisiana (Petre v Opelousas General Hospital 
517 So 2d 1019 (1987), reversed in part on other grounds, 530 So 2d 1151 (1988)); Massachusetts 
(Viccaro v.Milunsky 551 N.E.2d 8 (1990)); Michigan (Taylor v Kurapati 600 N.W.2d 670 (1999)); 
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ful life has not been considered at federal level, but lower courts, including one 
appellate court, have followed McKay.218 
4 Existing authorities: Australia 
A NSW wrongful life claim219 was summarily dismissed on the authority of 
McKay.  In a Queensland case where wrongful life was pleaded but not pursued, 
the judge indicated McKay would have been followed.220  In 2002, three matters 
were heard together in the NSW Supreme Court.221  Studdert J, also following 
McKay, held that while the doctor has a duty of care to the foetus (or rather, to 
the born person the foetus will become), this is merely a duty not to damage or 
injure; and, since no damage in wrongful life cases can be established, the action 
must fail.  Studdert J also raised policy concerns about contravening the sanctity 
of human life, harming the self-esteem of the disabled, and allowing children to 
sue their parents for wrongful life.222 
Two of the plaintiffs appealed Studdert J’s decision.  The NSW Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal.223  Spigelman CJ held that since a wrongful life plaintiff 
must assert ‘that it would be preferable [for the plaintiff] if she or he had not 
been born’, and since this assertion raises ‘highly contestable’ ethical issues on 
which ‘[t]here is no widely accepted ethical principle’, therefore the doctor 
should owe no duty of care to the child;224 for imposing a duty of care ‘must 
reflect values generally, or at least widely, held in the community.’225  Further, 
‘in order to constitute damage which is legally cognisable…it must be estab-
lished that non-existence is preferable to life with the disabilities to the child’;226 
                                                                                                                                         
Missouri (Wilson v Kuenzi 751 SW 2d 741 (1988)); Nevada (Greco v United States 893 P.2d 345 
(1995)); New Hampshire (Smith v Cote 513 A.2d 341 (1986)); New York (Becker v Schwartz 386 N.E. 
2d 807 (1978)); North Carolina (Azzolino v Dingfelder 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985)); Ohio (Hester v Dwivedi 
733 N.E. 1161 (2000)); Philadelphia (Ellis v Sherman 515 A 2d 1327 (1986)); Texas (Nelson v Kruzen 
678 S.W.2d 918 (1984)); West Virginia (James G. v Caserta 332 S.E.2d 872 (1985)); Wisconsin (Dumer 
v St. Michael’s Hospital 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975)); Wyoming (Beardsley v Wierdsma 650 P 2d 288 
(1982)).  See: Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460, [35]; SEYMOUR, supra note 5, at 107-8. 
218
  Arndt v Smith [1994] 8 WWR 568 (British Columbia Supreme Court), overturned on another issue 
[1995] 2 SCR 539; Jones v Rostig (1999) 44 CCLT (2d) 312 (British Columbia Supreme Court); Lacroix 
v Dominique [2001] MBCA 122 (Manitoba Court of Appeal); Mickle v Salvation Army Grace Hospital 
(1988) 166 DLR (4th) 743 (Ontario General Division).  These cases are collected in: Edwards v Blome-
ley [2002] NSWSC 460, [26]-[32].  
219
  Bannerman v Mills (1991) ATR 81-079. 
221
  Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460; Harriton v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461; Waller v James 
[2002] NSWSC 462. 
222
  Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460, [119]; Harriton v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461, [71]; 
Waller v James [2002] NSWSC 462, [66]. 
226
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [43] (Spigelman CJ), 
original emphasis. 
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but as the plaintiffs failed to argue that non-existence would be preferable for 
them, no damage had been shown.227  Ipp JA likewise accepted the ‘non-
existence’ argument in McKay, holding that since it is ‘impossible to use non-
existence as a comparator’,228 therefore it is impossible to demonstrate either that 
damage has occurred or what the appropriate measure of damages would be.229  
Further, wrongful life actions offend the ‘weighty’ principle of the sanctity of 
life.230 
Mason P in dissent held that since wrongful birth and wrongful life both involve 
‘losses stemming from the creation of life’ by medical negligence, they are 
essentially similar causes of action and it would be ‘incoherent’ to disallow 
recovery for wrongful life given that recovery for wrongful birth is allowed.231  
Further, compensation would be allowed on ordinary principles: wrongful life 
involves physical damage232 (in the form of disability) that is reasonably fore-
seeable (the plaintiffs ‘are persons whom the medical practitioners would have 
known as likely to come into being and as likely to suffer and have special needs 
of care if certain steps were not taken’233), reasonably preventable (by ‘giv[ing] 
advice and treatment to the mothers that would have prevented the suffering 
presently endured by the [plaintiffs]’234), and caused by the doctor’s conduct 
(since the doctors ‘omitted to give [such] advice and treatment’235).  As in 
Cattanach (where there was no offset for the speculative emotional benefits 
brought by the child), there is no need for a speculative offset for the putative 
benefits of existence over non-existence.236  Having thus rejected the ‘non-
existence’ argument as well as other anti-recovery arguments,237 Mason P 
concluded that damages should be awarded. 
It will now be argued that normal principles do indeed permit recovery of dam-
ages (Section 2); and that the policy arguments against recovery are weak (Sec-
tion 3). 
                                                           
227
 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [46] (Spigelman CJ). 
228
 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [266] (Ipp JA). 
229
 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [234]-[237], [271], 
[279], [320]-[321] (Ipp JA).  As Spigelman CJ noted (see at [6]), Ipp JA routinely confuses damage (loss 
or injury) with damages (an amount awarded in compensation for loss or injury); so it is not always clear 
which one he means.  But it emerges (at [279]) that he sees both as problematic.  Ipp JA also argued (at 
[337]) that ‘at the present time, when legislatures throughout the country have legislated or have fore-
shadowed legislation restricting liability for negligence…it would be quite wrong to expand, by judicial 
fiat, the law of negligence into new areas.’  To this Mason P replied (at [164]): ‘I know of no legal 
principle that directs the common law to pause or to go into reverse simply because of an accumulation 
of miscellaneous statutory overrides.’ 
230
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [303], [348] (Ipp JA). 
233
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [108] (Mason P). 
234
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [116] (Mason P). 
235
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [116] (Mason P). 
236
  Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [161]-[162] (Mason P). 
237
 Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [121], [124], [135], 
[139], [141] (Mason P). 
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B Do Normal Tort Law Principles Support Recovery of 
Damages? 
1 Duty and breach of duty: physical damage 
(a)  Duty to the foetus 
In wrongful life, the doctor’s conduct occurs before the plaintiff’s birth.  At 
common law the foetus has no rights until birth,238 but doctors have a duty not to 
damage the foetus, since such damage may cause damage to the born person the 
foetus will become.  A duty of care may thus be owed to a person not yet 
born.239  Similarly, a duty of care may be owed to a person not yet conceived, 
since present actions may cause damage to the person once conceived and 
born.240  For example, a baby food manufacturer who negligently allows toxins 
into the food will be liable for injuries caused to babies who ingest the food two 
years from now, even though some of those babies have not yet been con-
ceived.241  In either case the duty is to prevent physical damage to the person 
who may later be born. 
Conversely, if the doctor’s conduct cannot cause physical damage to the person 
who may later be born, there is simply no duty of care (unless on the basis of 
pure economic loss).  A fortiori there would be no breach of duty of care, no 
causation of damage, and no liability (again, unless on the basis of pure eco-
nomic loss).  So liability in wrongful life depends crucially on whether the 
doctor’s conduct can cause physical damage to the plaintiff. 
(b) Physical damage contrasted with damage to the value of                                     
one’s life as a whole 
McKay and subsequent cases have effectively ignored the issue of physical 
damage and have instead focused on the plaintiff’s life as a whole.  They have 
required the plaintiff to show ‘damage’ in the sense of his very existence, his life 
as a whole, being worse off through the negligence than it would otherwise have 
been (hence the need to show his existence is worse than non-existence, since 
non-existence is what ‘would otherwise have been’).  Yet this requirement is 
misguided, since in no other case is the plaintiff required to prove ‘damage’ in 
this sense.   
 
 
                                                           
239
  Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; Burton v Islington Health Authority (1993) QB 204; De Martell v 
Merton & Sutton Health Authority (1993) QB 204; Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460, [54]. 
241
  X & Y v Pal, (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, 40 (Clarke JA) (New South Wales Court of Appeal); Waller v 
James, [2002] NSWSC 462, [17] (New South Wales Supreme Court, 2002).]. 
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The Cattanach plaintiffs, for example, were certainly not required to show their 
lives as a whole were worse off for the birth of their son (and the ‘blessing’ 
argument, the claim that their lives were better off, was rejected as irrelevant242).  
As a matter of legal coherence, the same definition of ‘damage’ must apply to 
wrongful life as applies in other cases.  Damage in law is either physical damage 
or pure economic loss,243 and in determining whether either of these has oc-
curred it is not necessary to look to the plaintiff’s life as a whole. 
Contra McKay, then, the wrongful life plaintiff need not show his life as a whole 
is worse off as a result of the negligence, and a fortiori need not show his exis-
tence is worse than non-existence.  He need only show, as with other plain-
tiffs,244 that he suffers reasonably foreseeable, reasonably preventable physical 
damage caused by the defendant’s conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
242
  See: above, Part II.C.1.(a). 
243
  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131; [2003] HCA 38, [67] (McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
246
 See: Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees & Another (1979) 1 QB 276 at 279; (1978) 
2 All ER 987; C v S [1987] 1 All ER 1230; (1988) 1 QB 135, 140 (Heilbron J); Re F (in utero) (1988) 
Fam 122, 138 (May LJ); B v Islington Health Authority (1991) 1 QB 638; De Martell v Merton & Sutton 
Health Authority (1993) QB 204, 213 (Phillips J); Burton v Islington Health Authority (1993) QB 204, 
226 (Dillon LJ); Re MB [1997] 8 Med. L.R. 217; St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S  [1998] 3 All 
ER 673; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA); Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T (1983) 1 Qd R 396, 400 (Qld 
SC, Williams J), 406 (Qld CA); (1983) 57 ALJR 285, 287 (High Court, Gibbs CJ); Yunghanns v Can-
doora No 19 Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 524, [75]-[86].  To illustrate: if a negligently performed amniocentesis 
causes the foetus temporary pain or deformity but has no effects at or after birth, the person once born 
could hardly sue for negligence; and this precisely because damage before birth is not damage in law (or 
in other words, damage in law is always damage to the body, property or finances of a legal person: a 
legal non-person cannot suffer legally recognised damage). 
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(c)  Can the doctor in wrongful life cause physical damage to the child? 
In wrongful life, the plaintiff suffers disability.  Disability is a recognised head 
of physical damage.245  Thus, the plaintiff suffers physical damage.  But since 
damage in law is always damage to a born person,246 the damage is better char 
acterised as disability suffered by a born person.  If the doctor takes reasonable 
care (by giving proper advice, diagnosis or treatment), the plaintiff will never be  
born, and so damage (to a born person) will never occur.  If the doctor fails to 
take reasonable care (by failing to give proper advice, diagnosis or treatment), 
physical damage—disability suffered by a born person—will occur.  Thus the 
doctor can allow or prevent physical damage, and so can be held as a matter of 
common sense and the ‘but for’ test to have caused that damage (in that his 
conduct is a cause of it).247  Of course, the doctor does not cause the viral or 
genetic condition that produces disability;248 and so his conduct is not the sole or 
direct biological cause of disability.  But the crucial point249 is that the doctor’s 
conduct is still a cause of physical damage (in this case, disability suffered by a 
born person).  So the doctor in wrongful life can cause physical damage to the 
child. 
(d) Physical damage and non-existence 
The ‘non-existence’ argument in McKay claims, contrary to the preceding argu-
ment, that the doctor’s conduct cannot cause damage, because without the con-
duct the plaintiff would not even exist.250  Although McKay incorrectly focused 
on the plaintiff’s life as a whole, the ‘non-existence’ argument might equally be 
thought to show the wrongful life plaintiff suffers no physical damage.251 
The issue, then, is whether conduct can cause physical damage to the plaintiff in 
circumstances where the plaintiff, without that conduct, would not even exist. 
                                                           
248
  McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166 (CA), 1178E-F (Stephenson LJ); Edwards 
v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460, [69]; Harriton v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461, [25]-[27]; Waller v 
James [2002] NSWSC 462, [39] & [43]. 
249
  See: March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 511; (1991) 99 ALR 423, 426-7; 
Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1, 6-7; 127 ALR 180, 183-4; 
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 480 & 490; 182 ALR 37, 50-1 & 59.  See also: Harriton v 
Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [121] (Mason P). 
250
  McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166 (CA), 1181D-F (Stephenson LJ), 1189C-D 
(Ackner LJ), 1191H-1193A (Griffiths LJ); Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460, [72]-[76]; Harriton 
v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461, [33]; Waller v James [2002] NSWSC 462, [49]; Harriton v Stephens; 
Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [234]-[237], [271], [279], [320]-[321] (Ipp JA); 
see also [43], [46] (Spigelman CJ). 
251
  Cf Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [42]-[43] (Spigel-
man CJ) (appearing to endorse this logic).  Discussions about non-existence are liable to invoke philoso-
phical speculation rather than established legal principle, and a court wishing to avoid such speculations 
could simply accept the point (already made: above, Part III.B.1.(c)) that disability is a recognised head 
of physical damage.  
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This certainly seems possible.  For example, many wrongful life plaintiffs suffer 
brain damage.  Brain damage is a form of physical damage, since the brain is a 
physical thing.  So many wrongful life plaintiffs suffer physical damage.  As 
argued, the doctor can allow or prevent that damage, and so on ordinary princi-
ples causes it.252  So the doctor’s conduct can cause physical damage even 
though the plaintiff, without that conduct, would not exist. 
More generally, as a matter of common sense (which can be the only guide, 
since neither authorities nor dictionaries define ‘physical damage’ in detail), 
malformed body or brain parts are physical damage even where the alternative is 
non-existence.  For example, suppose rescuer X saves baby Y’s life by dragging 
Y from the path of a speeding train.  As a result, part of Y’s body or brain—say, 
a foot that was wedged in the track and had to be forcibly removed—becomes 
malformed (and thus physically damaged).  Here, X’s conduct plainly causes 
physical damage to Y—the malformed body or brain part—even though, without 
X’s conduct, Y would not exist (and, if that was the only way to save Y, could 
not exist).  Likewise, in wrongful life, the doctor’s conduct causes physical 
damage to the plaintiff—the malformations of brain or body, occurring in a born 
person, that comprise the disability—even though, without the conduct, the 
plaintiff would not exist (and, if the disability is genetic, could not exist).  In 
both cases (the X and Y case and wrongful life), physical damage is caused even 
though the alternative is non-existence. 
Of course, the rescuer X could escape liability for the physical damage caused to 
Y.  This, however, is not because X did not cause physical damage to Y (as 
argued, X did cause such damage); rather because, in negligence, one may 
permissibly risk or cause lesser damage (such as a malformed foot) in order to 
prevent greater damage (such as a person’s death).253  In contrast, since non-
existence (in the sense of never having been born) is not legally recognised 
damage, one cannot say that the doctor in wrongful life may permissibly risk or 
cause lesser damage (disability) in order to prevent greater damage (non-
existence).  Put another way, the clear social utility of saving a person’s life 
justifies the rescuer’s causation of the malformed foot; whereas giving negligent 
diagnosis, advice or treatment and thereby risking unwanted pregnancy has no 
clear social utility and hence does not justify the doctor’s causation of disability.  
So the rescuer X, on normal principles, could escape liability in respect of the 
physical damage he causes;254 but the doctor in wrongful life could not necessar-
ily do the same. 
                                                           
253
  See: Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 2 All ER 368; [1954] 1 WLR 835; Marshall v 
Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260 (Nova Scotia SC); Health & Community Services (NT), Department of v J W 
B & S M B (Marion's case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; (1992) 106 ALR 385, 452 (McHugh J); Krishna v 
Loustos [2000] NSWCA 272; [2000] ACL Rep 300 NSW 73. 
255
  See: SEYMOUR, supra note 5, at 160-164, 176.  For the purposes of this paper I assume the common 
sense view that we were once foetuses. 
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It might be objected that the rescue analogy is imperfect for a further reason: had 
the rescue not occurred, Y would have ceased to exist; whereas in wrongful life, 
had the doctor’s conduct not occurred, the plaintiff never would have existed.  
This, however, is simply not true of rubella cases, where the plaintiff is already 
conceived when the negligence occurs and hence would still have existed (as an 
embryo or foetus, though not as a legal person255) had the conduct not occurred.  
Thus at the very least the rubella plaintiff’s disabilities would still count as 
physical damage.  Could one then claim that if a failed sterilisation plaintiff 
suffers the very same sorts of disabilities—but suffers them genetically—then 
these disabilities do not count as physical damage, since without the conduct the 
plaintiff really would never have existed?  This distinction is untenable: as a 
matter of common sense, if the disability is the same in each case, it is physical 
damage in each case (and so for example, if brain damage is physical damage 
when suffered by a rubella plaintiff, then it is still physical damage when suf-
fered by a failed sterilisation plaintiff).  Accordingly, one cannot say it is only 
rubella plaintiffs who suffer physical damage: other types of wrongful life plain-
tiff can also suffer physical damage. 
Thus, in wrongful life the doctor’s conduct can cause physical damage to the 
child.  That damage—disability suffered by a born person—will occur whenever 
a disabled child (trivially or severely disabled) results from the negligence. 
(e)  Existence worse than non-existence 
Given the preceding argument, a wrongful life plaintiff seeking to demonstrate 
damage (in the sense of legally recognised damage) need only show he suffers 
malformations of brain or body: again, contra McKay, the plaintiff need not 
show his existence is worse than non-existence. 
Nevertheless, it appears the child would also suffer physical damage if his dis-
abilities are so severe that they do restrict him to a life worse than non-existence: 
a life with so much pain, suffering and indignity, and so little pleasure or mean-
ingful activity, that it genuinely would be better for the child if he did not exist.  
The damage in such cases is simply the state of (physically) existing.  The prob-
lem of comparing severely disabled existence with non-existence (so as to say 
existence might be worse) can be solved by placing the value of non-existence at 
zero.  The value of non-existence must be zero, because non-existence is noth-
ingness, and so has no value—zero value.  Fixing non-existence at zero value, 
one can then ask whether the bad things in the child’s life outweigh the good; 
and, if they do, non-existence would be better. 
It may be objected here that non-existence simply cannot be compared to any-
thing else, and that any attempt to do so (for example, by giving it zero value) is 
misguided.256  Yet this objection misfires, since comparisons with non-existence 
                                                           
256
  Cf. Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [147] (Mason P) 
(noting this objection), [266], [271] (Ipp JA) (endorsing essentially this objection). 
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are both common and necessary in common sense and in law.257  For example, 
one is glad—better off—to exist now than to have been killed five minutes ago.  
Yet, had one been killed, one would not now exist.  So, in saying one is better 
off alive, one is comparing existence with non-existence and judging that one is 
better than the other.  Similarly, disabled existence has been held a ‘gift’,258 a 
great benefit, something better than the alternative (which could only be non-
existence).  Here, one is again comparing existence with non-existence and 
judging which is better or worse.  Or again: in passive euthanasia, courts have 
held that, given low enough quality of life, continued life may be worse, or at 
least no better, than non-existence (death).259  In all these cases, comparisons 
with non-existence—and judgments about which is better or worse—are possi-
ble.  Logically, then, if one’s quality of life were as bad as or worse than in the 
passive euthanasia cases—as with exceptionally severe disability—then life 
could be even worse than non-existence. 
The objection that it is outside judicial competence to assess whether the plain-
tiff’s existence is worse than non-existence260 ignores the fact that virtually the 
same assessment is made in passive euthanasia.  The objection that disabled 
existence can be compared with ceasing to exist but not with never existing (so 
that existence might be worse than one but not the other) will again produce 
absurd distinctions between rubella and failed sterilisation plaintiffs.  So, in 
exceptionally severe cases, the doctor’s conduct does cause the plaintiff physical 
damage, that damage being the state of (physically) existing. 
(f) Reasonable steps to avoid physical damage 
Since the doctor’s conduct may cause reasonably foreseeable physical damage to 
the plaintiff—the damage being disability, or else existence worse than non-
existence—the doctor owes the child a duty of care and must take reasonable 
steps to prevent that damage.  The only way to prevent the damage is to prevent 
an unwanted disabled child from being born; hence that is the content of the 
duty.261  Reasonable steps to prevent the birth of an unwanted disabled child 
                                                           
257
  See also: Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [157] (Mason 
P). 
258
  McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166 (CA), 1193B (Griffiths LJ). 
259
  Penny Dimopoulos & Mirko Bagaric, The Moral Status of Wrongful Life Claims, 32 COMMON LAW 
WORLD REV. 35, 58-60 (2003).  See: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; [1993] 1 All ER 821; 
Re a Ward of Court (1995) 50 BMLR 140; Re J (A Minor) [1990] 3 All ER 930; [1991] 2 WLR 140; Re 
C (A Minor) [1989] 2 All ER 782; Gardner; Re BWV [2003] VSC 173 [43] (obiter); Hunter Area Health 
Service v Marchlewski [2000] 51 NSWLR 268; [2000] NSWCA 294, [91] (obiter).  Note that quality of 
life is measured objectively or externally (that is, by persons other than the patient), since in most cases 
the patient is permanently unconscious and hence cannot assess his own quality of life; though the point 
is still to determine what is in the patient’s best interests. 
261
 Note that the duty of care arises only where the disabled child is unwanted.  If the disabled child is 
wanted, the doctor’s conduct will have no bearing on whether the child exists (and suffers physical 
damage)—in which case there is no possibility of causing physical damage and hence no duty of care 
(unless on other grounds). 
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would be the exercise of reasonable care and skill in providing diagnosis, advice, 
sterilisation or abortion;262 for reasonable care in these matters will reduce the 
chance of an unwanted disabled child being born (by increasing the chance of 
effective contraception or abortion), and thus reduce the risk of physical damage 
(disability) occurring.  It would not, of course, be reasonable to provide mislead-
ing advice or to lobby for an abortion.  Hence the duty in wrongful life—
providing adequate diagnosis, advice, sterilisation or abortion—has the same 
content as in wrongful birth;263 though in wrongful life the duty is owed to the 
future child via the parents.264 
2 Damage, causation, remoteness and damages 
Where a duty of care is owed and breached, and a disabled child results, physical 
damage—disability, or existence worse than non-existence—is caused.  That 
damage is of a reasonably foreseeable kind (being the very sort of thing that 
might result from failure to provide proper advice, diagnosis or treatment), as are 
the pain, suffering and disability costs that flow from it.265  Accordingly, the 
defendant is liable on normal principles for those costs.266 
At this point, however, the ‘non-existence’ argument resurfaces.  Damages must, 
as far as money can, place the plaintiff in the same position as if the negligence 
had not occurred.267  Thus, to determine the appropriate measure of damages (in 
a case where the plaintiff claims for pain, suffering and economic loss), one 
                                                           
262
 See: Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; (1992) 109 ALR 625. 
263
  See: above, Part II.A.1. 
264
  In Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan [2004] NSWCA 93, [25]-[28], Spigel-
man CJ held that because the relationship between the wrongful life plaintiff and the doctor is mediated 
through the parents, that relationship is insufficiently ‘direct’ to create a duty of care. This seems implau-
sible: if a doctor advises a pregnant woman (who opposes abortion) to spend lots of time with people 
who recently contracted rubella, the resulting disabled child (who, but for the negligence, would have 
been born without disabilities) could plainly sue the doctor for negligence—meaning there is sufficient 
‘directness’ of relationship in this case; yet the relationship is surely no less ‘direct’ in wrongful life.  
Note also that the parents need not be seen as somehow acting on behalf of the potential child (contra the 
apparent view of Spigelman CJ at [27]); one need only recognise that the information provided to the 
parents by the doctor will affect whether an unwanted disabled child comes into existence and so suffers 
physical damage (disability). 
265
 Costs flowing from (caused by) the disability are those a non-disabled person in the same position as 
the plaintiff (same except for the disability) would not incur—for example, nursing costs.  Comparison 
between the plaintiff and a non-disabled person is legitimate here, since one is merely asking what flows 
from the disability (and this involves considering what would happen with versus without the disability).  
Earlier it was asked what flows from the negligence.  The appropriate comparison there is between 
disabled existence and never being born (non-existence), since these are what would happen with versus 
without the negligence. 
266
  See: Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No2)) [1967] 
1 AC 617; [1967] ALR 97; Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; (1985) 
59 ALR 722. 
267
  Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 (Lord Blackburn); Lee Transport Co. Ltd. 
v. Watson (1940) 64 CLR 1, 13-14 (Dixon J); Butler v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 
CLR 185, 191; [1966] ALR 1025; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; (1981) 37 ALR 481, 486 
(Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 510 (Mason J), 527-8 (Brennan J); Haines v Bendall  (1991) 172 CLR 60, 63; 
99 ALR 385, 386 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428; 
(1994) 124 ALR 539, 543 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
2005 The Birth Torts   359     
 
determines in what respects the plaintiff’s actual state involves additional pain, 
suffering or economic loss as compared with the hypothetical state he would 
have been in had the negligence not occurred; and one then determines an 
amount of money to compensate for that additional pain, suffering or economic 
loss.  Put another way, ‘placing the plaintiff in the same position as if the negli-
gence had not occurred’ means the plaintiff’s actual level of pain, suffering and 
economic loss, when combined with the award of damages, should be no worse 
from the (reasonable) plaintiff’s point of view than the level of pain, suffering 
and economic loss in the hypothetical situation where the negligence does not 
occur.  Inevitably, then, in wrongful life one must compare the plaintiff’s actual 
state with a hypothetical state of non-existence (since non-existence is the state 
he would be in had the negligence not occurred); and it may be objected that this 
comparison is impossible, so that no damages can be awarded.268 
There is no impossibility, however.  A nonexistent person incurs no pain, suffer-
ing or economic loss; a wrongful life plaintiff does.  So a wrongful life plaintiff’s 
actual state involves additional pain, suffering and economic loss (such as dis-
ability costs) as compared with the hypothetical state he would have been in had 
the negligence not occurred; hence one can then determine, in the usual way, an 
amount to compensate for that additional pain, suffering and economic loss.  Put 
another way, one should ensure the plaintiff’s actual level of pain, suffering and 
economic loss, when combined with the award of damages, is no worse from the 
(reasonable) plaintiff’s point of view than the level of pain, suffering and eco-
nomic loss that occurs in the hypothetical state of non-existence (namely, no 
pain, suffering or economic loss).  Again, damages for pain, suffering and eco-
nomic loss can thus be calculated in the normal way, and indeed will be much 
the same as if the hypothetical situation involved a healthy, living plaintiff who 
likewise suffers no negligently caused pain, suffering or economic loss.  Impor-
tantly, however, the wrongful life plaintiff’s level of earnings and earning capac-
ity, even if they are precisely zero, will never be worse than zero; hence, in terms 
of economic loss, the plaintiff could not recover for loss of earnings or loss of 
earning capacity—merely for economic losses taking the form of expenditure, 
such as disability costs. 
Could the wrongful life plaintiff also recover upbringing costs (which are gratui-
tous care costs and thus treated as a form of economic loss suffered by the plain-
tiff269)? If the plaintiff’s claim is based on mere disability, rather than on 
existence being worse than non-existence, then the defendant is not liable for 
upbringing costs, since upbringing costs are not caused by the physical damage 
(disability) and so are not consequential loss.  Put another way, upbringing costs 
result from the plaintiff’s very existence, hence are not consequential upon the 
physical damage complained of (disability), and so cannot be recovered. 
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However, if the plaintiff’s claim is based on existence being worse than non-
existence, the physical damage is not disability but existence itself (in a se-
verely disabled state).  Consequential damage—for which the defendant is 
liable—would then include all foreseeable damage flowing from that exis-
tence: pain, suffering, disability costs and upbringing costs.  Damages in such 
a case should allow for sufficient care and treatment to ensure the child’s life 
will be no worse than non-existence (the state he would be in but for the negli-
gence). 
In short: where the child is disabled (to any degree), the doctor is liable for pain, 
suffering, and disability costs.  Where the child’s life is worse than non-
existence, the doctor is liable for pain, suffering, disability and upbringing costs. 
3 Offsetting benefits and harms 
On normal principles, financial benefits caused by the negligence are, except for 
gifts or insurance payouts, offset against financial costs.270  Benefits gained 
through legislation may reduce damages, depending on statutory intention.271  In 
wrongful life, the negligence causes the child’s existence, hence also causes any 
financial benefits existence may bring.  Thus, disability and upbringing costs 
would be reduced according to any financial benefits the plaintiff will likely 
receive through employment and, depending on statutory intention, welfare 
benefits.  For mild disabilities, expected benefits would often offset financial 
losses to zero. 
It may be objected here that since a living person, no matter how badly disabled, 
can receive welfare benefits, whereas a nonexistent person cannot, therefore a 
living person is necessarily economically better off than a nonexistent person—
better off than zero—so that the wrongful life plaintiff would not be entitled to 
any damages for economic loss (such as disability or upbringing costs).  In 
response, however, the fact that the negligence causes some economic benefits 
does not entail that those benefits completely offset the plaintiff’s economic 
losses.272  If the plaintiff’s economic losses (the costs of the disability and, in 
some cases, upbringing) exceed what the plaintiff does or can gain through 
employment and welfare, then the plaintiff suffers an overall economic loss and 
hence is economically worse off than zero as a result of the negligence: the 
plaintiff will always remain, as it were, ‘in the red’ (whereas a nonexistent 
person would suffer no such overall loss).  So the objection fails to show a living 
person is necessarily economically better off than zero, and indeed merely re-
states the point, already conceded, that because the earnings and earning capacity 
of a living person will never be worse than zero, a wrongful life plaintiff could 
not recover damages for loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity. 
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Finally, the breach of duty in wrongful life—failure to provide adequate diagno-
sis, advice or sterilisation—may benefit the plaintiff overall, since the breach 
brings with it the emotional and other benefits of existence, and these may in 
some sense outweigh the costs of the disability.  Similarly, the breach in wrong-
ful birth may benefit the plaintiffs overall, since the breach brings with it the 
emotional benefits of a child, and these may in some sense outweigh the costs of 
pregnancy and upbringing.  However, as Cattanach made clear, emotional 
benefits do not negate liability, and do not reduce damages for pain, suffering, or 
economic loss.273 
4 Pure economic loss and wrongful life 
If, contra the above, wrongful life involves no physical damage, damages might 
still be recovered through the principles governing pure economic loss.  If the 
doctor’s conduct causes the birth of a child (healthy or disabled), the child will 
suffer economic loss: upbringing costs and, if disabled, disability costs.  The 
Perre factors are satisfied as for wrongful birth,except that there is no ‘known 
reliance’ (the unborn plaintiff cannot possibly rely on anything).  Given that all 
the factors the plaintiff possibly can satisfy are satisfied, a duty is most likely 
owed to the child to prevent economic loss.  Reasonable steps to prevent such 
loss would again involve reasonable care and skill in providing the parents with 
diagnosis, advice,274 sterilisation or abortion; for this reduces the likelihood that 
the unwanted child will be born and suffer economic loss.  If reasonable care is 
not taken, and as a result the child (healthy or disabled) is born, the doctor will 
be liable for upbringing costs, including, if the child is disabled, disability costs.  
Liability would then be offset as for consequential loss, so that in the case of a 
healthy or mildly disabled child financial losses would likely be offset to zero. 
Thus, while a claim for pure economic loss precludes damages for pain and 
suffering, it would potentially allow a disabled plaintiff to recover upbringing 
costs, which (as argued) could not be recovered in a claim for consequential loss. 
C  Are There Sound Policy Arguments Against Recovery? 
1 Contravening the sanctity of life 
Allowing wrongful life claims—in particular, imposing a duty to prevent the 
unwanted disabled child’s birth—has been said to contradict the sanctity of 
human life.275 
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This seems, however, to be another invalid slide from general values to a par-
ticular legal conclusion.276  If ‘sanctity of life’ means that preventing birth—
through abortion, say—is in general immoral, then this is too controversial to be 
given legal force; moreover Cattanach showed there can be a duty to prevent the 
birth of unwanted children.  If ‘sanctity of life’ means human life must always be 
judged better than non-existence (just as some think a healthy child must always 
be judged a ‘blessing’), then this contradicts common sense and the passive 
euthanasia cases.  If ‘sanctity of life’ means courts should nevertheless pretend 
human life is always better than non-existence, then it is not clear why courts 
should entertain a falsehood, particularly where this prevents compensation on 
normal principles; the court should rather award damages to ensure the child’s 
existence is not worse than non-existence.  At any rate, most wrongful life 
claims would be brought on the basis of mere disability, or, failing that, pure 
economic loss; and in these cases there is no suggestion that the child’s existence 
is worse than non-existence. 
Even if wrongful life actions did at some level infringe the sanctity of life, they 
would at a deeper level uphold it; for the law would in effect be saying that it 
values the lives of the disabled enough to ensure they can recover the cost of the 
care and treatment they deserve.277 
2 Offending the disabled 
To accept that disabled existence might be worse than non-existence would, it is 
said, ‘be offensive’ to disabled people,278 reducing their ‘self esteem’ and stand-
ing in society.279 
This objection does not apply to claims brought on the basis of mere disability or 
pure economic loss, since in these cases there is no suggestion that the child’s 
existence is worse than non-existence.  Further, common sense and the passive 
euthanasia cases show severely disabled existence can be worse than non-
existence; normal principles should not be overturned merely because some 
people find this reality offensive.  Also, a plaintiff claiming on the basis that his 
existence is worse than non-existence evidently believes this is so, if he is capa-
ble of understanding the matter at all; hence a court allowing the claim merely 
repeats what the plaintiff already believes, or asserts what he cannot understand. 
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3 Appeals to the afterlife 
Those who believe the harms of this life will be outweighed by the joys of an 
afterlife would evidently deny that non-existence is ever worse than existence (at 
least in the very long run).  Thus, it is said, for courts to allow claims based on 
existence being worse than non-existence would adjudicate the afterlife issue in 
favour of non-believers; and, as ‘a worldly court’ cannot do this—it must remain 
neutral—such claims must be disallowed.280 
Again, this objection gives no reason to disallow claims brought on the basis of 
mere disability or pure economic loss, since there is no suggestion in such cases 
that the plaintiff’s existence is worse than non-existence.  In any case, to use 
unreal speculations about the fate of the dead as an excuse to ignore the very real 
needs and suffering of the living is manifestly unjust.  If such speculations were 
allowed, the following would always be a good defence: ‘Yes, Your Honour, I 
have negligently caused the plaintiff all manner of economic loss in this life.  
But he may receive extra riches in heaven to compensate!  To allow recovery of 
damages would be to decide the ‘extra riches in heaven’ issue in favour of non-
believers; and this a worldly court cannot do.’281  The sane option is, plainly, to 
ignore such speculations.  Tort law deals with this life, not the next life; and so if 
this life, considered in itself, is worse than non-existence, then compensation 
should be payable subject to normal principles.   
4 Actions against parents 
If wrongful life claims were accepted, the child, it is said, could sue not only the 
doctor but the mother, ‘in the event that the mother was perceived to act unrea-
sonably’ in failing to abort; this could cause substantial ‘disturbance of family 
life’.282 However, as noted in wrongful birth, courts are loath to find that failure 
to have an abortion is unreasonable. Moreover the argument, if accepted, would 
merely prevent children suing mothers; it would not prevent children suing 
doctors.283 
5 Trivial disability 
Griffiths LJ in McKay noted the difficulty of specifying ‘how gravely deformed’ 
the plaintiff must be before a wrongful life claim would be possible.284 
The arguments presented here avoid this difficulty: a wrongful life action is 
possible wherever an unwanted child is born through medical negligence and 
suffers a malformation of brain or body that results in pain, suffering or eco-
nomic loss.  A mere constitutional weakness—for example, having weaker arms 
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or eyes than average—is not, of course, physical damage; but a slightly de-
formed ear would be, and if it causes pain, suffering or economic loss (such as 
medical costs), then it could ground an action for wrongful life. 
Wrongful life actions would not, therefore, be restricted to the severely disabled: 
even the trivially disabled could claim.  It may be objected that this is absurd.  
But that is hardly clear.  Normal principles place no lower limit on the degree of 
physical damage required to ground an action in negligence—one could sue, for 
example, for the minor pain and suffering of a stubbed toe—and so it is to be 
expected that a case for wrongful life based on normal principles will likewise 
place no lower limit on the necessary degree of damage.  There is no more 
injustice or absurdity here than in other categories of negligence.  Further, trivial 
disabilities will produce trivial damages, since such disabilities will cause little 
pain and suffering and the plaintiff’s likely earnings will offset financial losses 
to zero.  This too is neither unjust nor absurd. 
There does remain the issue of ‘how gravely deformed’ a plaintiff must be 
before his existence would be judged worse than non-existence (so as to allow 
recovery of upbringing costs).  This issue, while difficult, is no more difficult 
than in passive euthanasia, and should be approached by courts in the same 
cautious and compassionate way.285  In practice the issue may be easier to de-
cide, since the outcome concerns damages rather than life or death. 
6 Conclusion 
Recovery of damages for wrongful life is counterintuitive, but a careful applica-
tion of normal principles shows this is the correct position.  Once the ‘non-
existence’ argument is exposed as irrelevant (since it incorrectly focuses on the 
plaintiff’s life as a whole, rather than on negligent causation of physical dam-
age), the way to recovery is clear.  Typically in wrongful life, damages should be 
recoverable for pain, suffering, and disability costs, with disability costs offset 
according to income the plaintiff will receive through employment and, perhaps, 
statutory welfare benefits.  In extraordinary cases where existence is worse than 
non-existence, the plaintiff could also recover upbringing costs.  However, since 
wrongful life will not normally allow recovery of upbringing costs—whereas 
wrongful birth normally will—the disabled child and parents would need to 
bring a combined action for both birth torts in order to secure full compensation.. 
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